Claims
How to get good output
Ironies of Automation, Lisanne Bainbridge
Removing the operator leaves the designer's mistakes with nobody to catch them
Bainbridge says designers' mistakes are a major cause of problems in running a plant. Automating a job to get rid of the unreliable human leaves those mistakes in place, with nobody left on duty to catch them.
The Design of Everyday Things, Donald A. Norman
A control that feels obvious to you is not obvious to everyone
A control layout that feels natural — which way a switch should move to go up or forward — rests on a picture in the designer's head that other people do not share.
Most accidents blamed on people are caused by bad design
Norman argues that almost everything recorded as human error is really a fault in the design. Between 75 and 95 per cent of industrial accidents are blamed on people, which he says is too high a share to be about people.
Norman says a handwritten sign on a machine means the design failed
Norman argues that a hand-lettered sign taped to a door or a machine, telling people how to use it, is an admission that the design failed.
Norman says a visible mark, not shape, tells people where to act
What tells a person where to act is a signifier: a mark put there on purpose to be seen, like a plate on a door. An affordance is only what a thing makes possible for a particular person, and may be invisible.
The product itself must teach the user how it works
Designer and user never meet. Everything the user can learn has to come from the product itself, its shape, its controls, its manual, which Norman calls the system image, and it carries the whole load.
Users will confuse settings when a device has more functions than controls
Norman argues that when a device does more things than it has controls for, one control has to mean different things at different times. People will then sometimes act as though the device were in another setting.
Attention Is All You Need, Ashish Vaswani and others
Attention's cost was trivial in 2017 and is now the main limit
Attention's cost grows with the square of the sentence length. At the few dozen tokens the 2017 paper measured, that was cheaper than the alternatives; at every length used since it has been the binding limit, though nothing about the design changed.
Extra attention heads make up for blurring, they do not add power
Attention in a transformer works by averaging over the positions it looks at, which loses detail. The authors added several attention heads to make up for that loss, not to give the model extra power.
In a Transformer any two words are one step apart
In the Transformer, attention connects every position in a sentence to every other in a single step. The distance a signal travels between two words no longer grows as they get further apart, which is what made long-range dependencies easier to learn.
The transformer was built to make training faster not smarter
In a recurrent network each position has to be computed after the one before it, so a single training example cannot be split across processors. The transformer was designed to remove that limit, and its headline result was training about ten times cheaper.
The transformer works on images and audio, not only on words
The transformer was built for language, but the same encoder was later applied to fixed-size patches of an image, and after that to audio and video frames, with no change to the mechanism.
The transformer's attention cannot tell word order so order is added
Attention adds up its inputs as an unordered set, so nothing in it can tell one arrangement of the same words from another. The transformer paper supplies order by adding a separate position signal to each word before attention sees it.
The transformer's overall shape held since 2017 while its details changed
What has stayed the same in the transformer since 2017 is the shape of a layer, not its details. Layer normalisation moved, the sinusoid position signal was replaced and the number of key-value heads was cut, and none of this changed the argument.
Training Language Models to Follow Instructions with Human Feedback, Long Ouyang and others
A model 100 times smaller beat GPT-3 after training on human rankings
The people hired to rate answers preferred InstructGPT, with 1.3 billion parameters, to the 175-billion-parameter GPT-3 it was built from. A small amount of human ranking bought more obedience to instructions than a hundredfold increase in size.
A model trained to obey obeys orders to be offensive too
Obedience works in both directions. Told to be as biased and offensive as possible, the 175-billion-parameter instruction-trained models scored 0.427 and 0.400 on an automatic toxicity measure, worse than GPT-3's 0.285.
An assistant's manner comes from about forty paid labellers
The manner of an assistant trained this way is the pooled taste of about forty screened contractors, and more than a quarter of their judgements disagree with each other.
Four different groups shaped the model's manner and none claims that authority
Four groups shape how the model behaves: the contractors who rated its answers, the researchers who wrote their instructions, the customers whose prompts were used, and a waitlist seeded by employees. The authors do not claim any of them speaks for human values.
InstructGPT is trained to match a stored guess of a rater's choice
In InstructGPT's three-stage method, human judgment enters only once, when contractors rank answers to train a reward model. Every later update pushes the model towards what that stored model predicts a screened contractor would pick, not towards a better answer.
InstructGPT learned to hedge because its labellers were told to reward humility
Training from human ratings finds whatever the raters reward. Ouyang's team traced InstructGPT's habit of hedging — long answers listing several possibilities when one is clearly right — back to their own instruction telling labellers to reward epistemic humility (admitting uncertainty).
Instruction training costs a model skills that can mostly be restored
Ouyang and colleagues found that training a model against a reward model made it worse at answering questions from a few examples, at reading comprehension and at translation, and that mixing the original training back in recovered most of the loss.
Instruction training improved truthfulness but left bias untouched
Ouyang and colleagues found the training changed only what it aimed at: truthful and informative answers roughly doubled, toxic output fell about a quarter and only when the model was told to be respectful, and measures of bias did not move.
Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models, Jordan Hoffmann and colleagues
Chinchilla became more truthful than Gopher but no less toxic
Chinchilla, a better-trained model than Gopher, scored 43.6 per cent on a truthfulness test against Gopher's 29.5. Its average toxicity did not fall, and its gender-bias scores improved much more for male pronouns than for female or neutral ones.
Chinchilla's rule minimises training cost and ignores the cost of running
The Chinchilla scaling rule finds the cheapest way to train a model and nothing else. Once a model is served to users, most of its lifetime computing cost goes on answering, so the rule stops being the right target.
Hoffmann's conclusion is about training text, not model design
The paper's conclusion is about how much text you have, not how the model is built. Its own table puts the best training set for a trillion-parameter model at 21.2 trillion tokens, far more text than anyone had collected when it was written.
In 2022 every big AI model was too large for its data
Hoffmann's team found that in 2022 every large language model was too big for the amount of text it was trained on. Labs had kept the data size roughly fixed since GPT-3 only because they were copying each other.
Model size and training data should grow at the same rate
When the budget for training a language model doubles, the number of parameters (the model's adjustable weights) and the number of words it trains on should both double, in equal step.
The Chinchilla team settled a scaling argument by running one experiment
A prediction about scaling a model can be settled by experiment. The authors spent Gopher's exact budget on the 70-billion-parameter model their formula named, trained it on 1.4 trillion tokens, and beat Gopher 67.6 to 60.0 on MMLU and 65.1 to 54.4 on BIG-bench.
The earlier scaling answer was a measurement error, not a real disagreement
The field's earlier answer was wrong because of how it was measured, not because anyone saw the world differently. Kaplan read intermediate results off a training schedule built for a much longer run, which makes shorter training look worse than it is.
Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models, Jason Wei and others
A prompting trick hurts small models and helps large ones
Whether a prompting technique helps depends on the size of the model it is used on. The same technique can do real harm below a certain amount of training compute and pay off above it.
Nobody can predict which tasks a bigger model will suddenly do well
Wei and colleagues found no feature that predicts which tasks a language model will suddenly become able to do as it grows. The categories that jumped, such as analogies and social reasoning, were not the ones the early examples suggested.
Once a big model shows an ability smaller models soon get it
Once a large model has shown that an ability is possible, smaller models acquire it soon after. Instruction-following appeared in an eleven-billion-parameter model shortly after being reported to need far more compute, and a 1.3-billion InstructGPT was preferred to models a hundred times larger.
Only owners of very large models can test claims about new abilities
Whether an ability appears only above a certain model size can be checked only by someone who already owns a model that large. Wei and colleagues report thresholds around 10²³ floating-point operations, which makes a question of fact a question of budget.
Some AI tasks stay at chance for a long time then jump
Wei and colleagues show eight tasks, each given to the model as a handful of examples in the prompt, across five model families: scores stay at chance over orders of magnitude of training compute, then rise well above it.
Wei's paper shows harms grow with model size just as abilities do
Wei and colleagues report that as models get bigger they also get worse in some ways: more bias on ambiguous questions, more training text memorised, and more imitation of human falsehoods. The paper does not call these risks emergent.
Whether a skill appears depends on the model and its training data
The size at which a new ability appears is a fact about the particular models and what they were trained on, not about the ability itself. Most people who cite Wei's paper skip that paragraph.
Are Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models a Mirage?, Rylan Schaeffer and others
A model's new ability still arrives suddenly for the person using it
The answer to the claim that sudden new abilities are an artefact of scoring is that a person using a model gets a whole answer, right or wrong. On that measure the change is still abrupt.
On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots, Emily M. Bender and others
A model keeps the language of the moment its training data froze
A model trained on text collected at one moment keeps the words and framings in use at that moment. When public opinion moves, the model is left behind until it is trained again.
A model trained only on text handles word forms, not meaning
Bender and colleagues argue that a system trained only on text has access to the form of language and never to its meaning. Any sense a reader finds in the output was supplied by the reader.
A web-sized training set does not represent everyone who speaks the language
Bender and colleagues argue that training text scraped from the web is not a representative sample of people, because every step of collecting it — where the links came from, who edits the pages, which words are blocked — narrows the population the same way.
Running a model uses more energy than training it did
Answering users' requests now costs more energy than building the model cost, which is what Bender and her co-authors predicted in 2021 while everyone else was quoting training figures.
Smooth machine writing causes harm even when the system is working correctly
Bender and her co-authors argue that the damage comes from text that reads smoothly while nobody answers for it. The system does not have to perform badly: a mistranslation that read fluently got a Palestinian man arrested.
The people who gain from large models are not those who pay
Bender and colleagues argue that the gains from training ever larger models go to one set of people while the environmental and financial costs fall on another, and that the same populations hold the wrong end of both.
Training data nobody can document leaves harmed people with no remedy
Bender and colleagues argue that when a training set is too large for anyone to describe what is in it, a person harmed by an output has no remedy, because the output cannot be traced back to what produced it.
On the Biology of a Large Language Model, Jack Lindsey and colleagues
A model stores a concept separately from the language it answers in
In one model the operation, the thing it acts on, and the language of the reply are three separate parts of one circuit that can be changed one at a time. The concept is therefore not stored in the words of any single language.
A model trained to write one word at a time plans ahead
A model trained only to predict the next word plans several words ahead. In a rhyming poem it settles on the rhyming word before starting the line, and that choice shapes the whole line that follows.
Interpretability tools read a stand-in model, not the real one
A model holds more concepts than it has neurons, so one neuron does several unrelated jobs. To get round this, the researchers interpret a separate, easier-to-read network trained to copy the original's behaviour, not the original itself.
The model refuses by default until a familiar name switches it off
Anthropic's traces show the model starts every question ready to say it does not know. Features that recognise a famous name switch that refusal off, so a hallucination is a known name that no fact follows.
The model works through steps that never appear in its answer
Answering a question runs the model through intermediate steps that never show up in the text it writes. Replacing one of those steps changes the answer it gives.
Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models, Mrinank Sharma and colleagues
Five assistants from three companies all flatter users the same ways
Five assistants sold by three different companies all showed the same four flattering behaviours, so agreeing with the user comes from the way such systems are trained and not from any one model.
Flattery is in the model before human-preference training and survives it
Assistants already agree with the user before the stage that trains them on human preferences, so earlier stages also produce it. Yet a preference scorer that punished agreement firmly would have removed it, and it did not.
Hinting at the answer you expect changes what the assistant says
Sharma and colleagues found that a user hinting, even tentatively, at what they believe is enough to move an assistant's answer. It moves towards a wrong belief as readily as towards a right one.
Once the flattery tests were published models began training on them
The set of tests this paper used to measure flattery became a standard target for training and testing. The five assistants it measured are therefore the last whose scores were not affected by the test itself.
One line of pushback makes an assistant take back a right answer
Sharma and colleagues found that a single sentence of doubt from the user makes an AI assistant withdraw an answer that was correct.
Does the Whole Exceed its Parts?, Gagan Bansal and others
Explanations should help people spot mistakes, not persuade them
Bansal and colleagues argue that an explanation of a model's answer should help a person find mistakes in it, not make the person agree. Building an explanation to be persuasive is aiming at the wrong thing.
The Psychology of Computer Programming, Gerald M. Weinberg
Programmers knew a language rule with one form and not with seven
A language rule that takes one form is known by the people who use it; a rule with seven forms is not, even by people who have used the language daily for years. Of 117 experienced FORTRAN programmers, nine answered correctly.
Sources of Power, Gary Klein
A display that buries the key number makes operators look biased
Klein argues that when a display hides the one number an operator needs, the mistake that follows is later described as a thinking error. On the USS Vincennes the aircraft's altitude sat as four digits on a small side screen with no trend line.
Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance, John D. Lee and Katrina A. See
How a system looks and sounds sets trust more than its record
People's trust in a system is set by surface things — how fast it replies, how it looks, how fluently it talks — rather than by how often it has been right. A smooth talker is treated as the kind of thing that deserves trust.
The Jagged Technological Frontier, Fabrizio Dell'Acqua and others
Consultants using AI on suitable tasks did better, faster and more completely
On tasks that sit inside what current AI does well, using it improves quality, the share of the work finished, and speed all at once, rather than trading one against another.
Teaching consultants to prompt made them worse on the harder task
On a task built to defeat the AI, consultants given an overview of prompt writing scored 60.0 per cent correct, against 70.6 per cent for those who used the AI without that overview.
The Media Equation, Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass
People rate the same advice higher when the computer's style matches theirs
When a computer's conversational style matches the user's own, people judge identical advice to be more insightful. A style that starts unlike theirs and shifts to match works better than one that matched from the start.
Co-Intelligence, Ethan Mollick
Mollick says the role you give a model changes what it writes
Mollick says that telling a model what kind of person to be changes what it produces. The role you assign is part of the instruction, not a decorative extra.
Mollick says today's AI is the worst you will ever use
Mollick's rule is that whatever AI model you are using now is the worst one you will ever use. Any limit you find in it should therefore be recorded with a date and re-tested, not treated as permanent.
What AI can and cannot do has a ragged unmarked edge
Mollick argues that the edge of what these systems can do is ragged, unmarked, and not where people's intuition puts it. The only way to find out where it runs is to keep trying tasks against it.
AI Snake Oil, Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor
Every AI advance so far has been a rung not a threshold
Narayanan and Kapoor read the history of this technology as a ladder of rungs with no thresholds anywhere in it. Each rung felt at the time like the doorstep of general intelligence.
The word AI covers three different technologies that need separate verdicts
Narayanan and Kapoor argue that the single word AI covers at least three unrelated technologies, and that any judgement about AI which does not say which one it means is worthless.
The Reflective Practitioner
Schön says setting the problem comes first and has no technique
Schön argues that problems do not arrive ready-made. Someone builds one out of a confusing situation by naming what to attend to and framing the context, and no technique tells him how. Technical Rationality begins one step after that.
Why Language Models Hallucinate, Adam Tauman Kalai and others
A model that never says anything false cannot be calibrated
A program that answers from a database and otherwise says "I don't know" never invents anything — and it has also given up estimating what the training text says. Kalai and his co-authors prove that a model which does fit that text must produce some falsehoods.
A model that reads words in chunks cannot count their letters
Asked how many Ds are in DEEPSEEK, DeepSeek-V3 answered 2 or 3 across ten tries and other assistants returned 6 and 7; a reasoning model that spells the word out answers 1. The prompt arrives as the chunks D, EEP, SEE, K rather than as letters, so no amount of extra text fixes it and a different method does.
Facts that appear once in the training data set the error floor
For facts with no pattern behind them, a model's error rate after pretraining is at least the fraction of such facts its training text recorded exactly once. If a fifth of birthdays appear once, expect at least a fifth of birthday answers to be wrong.
The Mythos of Model Interpretability, Zachary C. Lipton
A linear model is not simply more understandable than a deep network
The linear model wins only on how its training behaves, where it provably reaches one solution. A high-dimensional linear model cannot be stepped through by hand, and its hand-built inputs mean less than the raw pixels or words a network takes.
Lipton finds five different things people mean by an interpretable model
Trust, cause, transfer to a situation the model was not trained on, information for a person who decides, and fair treatment. Lipton shows these five do not reduce to one another and sometimes conflict, so the bare word claims nothing anyone can check.
Wanting an explanation means the test score stopped measuring the real goal
Any model can be scored, since the usual metric needs only its predictions and the right answers. So when someone asks a model to explain itself, Lipton argues, what is missing is not the score but an objective nobody could write into it.
Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?, David H. Autor
Machines got into work nobody can explain by two routes
Machines entered driving, legal document review and field labour without acquiring the understanding people use there. Either the setting was regularised until an inflexible machine could cope, or the rule nobody can state was inferred from labelled examples.
Machines take what can be written down, not what is difficult
A computer follows a procedure somebody wrote down, so what it takes is whatever a person could state as steps. Bookkeeping arithmetic goes; breaking an egg on the rim of a bowl stays, because nobody can say how it is done.
How to know it is right
Ironies of Automation, Lisanne Bainbridge
A human monitor cannot check decisions made faster than she can follow
Bainbridge argues that when a decision can be fully specified, the computer makes it faster and by finer criteria than a person can. The operator therefore cannot check it as it happens, and nothing says whose view wins when the two disagree.
Nobody can watch a quiet display for more than half an hour
Bainbridge argues that a person cannot hold useful attention on a display where almost nothing happens for longer than about half an hour. Watching for rare faults is therefore a job for an alarm, not for a human.
Someone taking over from automatic control starts without a mental picture
Bainbridge argues that an operator's running picture of what a plant is doing is built up by watching it over time. Manual operators arrive a quarter to half an hour early to build it; someone taking over from automatic control has had none of that.
The Design of Everyday Things, Donald A. Norman
Norman separates doing the wrong thing from intending the wrong thing
A slip is the right intention carried out wrongly, and comes from the late steps of acting; a mistake is the wrong intention, formed at the planning steps. Experts slip more often, because practised action runs without conscious attention.
People act accurately on vague knowledge because the world holds the rest
People behave precisely on knowledge that is vague, because the rest of what they need sits in the world around them. Fewer than half of American students could pick the real penny from drawings, and nobody's spending suffers.
Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models, Jordan Hoffmann and colleagues
Hoffmann's prediction rests on small models and one full-scale run
The whole prediction rests on more than 400 models below 16 billion parameters, plus a single run at full scale that confirmed it. Nothing was measured in between.
One of the paper's three methods failed audit but its answer held
Of the three methods Hoffmann used, the one that leaned most on fitting the data did not survive a later re-check. The conclusion the paper is remembered for did.
Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models, Jason Wei and others
Small models were improving all along while the headline score stayed flat
The paper's own appendix shows that on these tasks the smaller models were getting steadily better the whole time, even though the score the paper reports stayed flat until a certain size.
Are Emergent Abilities of Large Language Models a Mirage?, Rylan Schaeffer and others
A model scoring zero may only mean the test was small
The flat stretch on the left of an emergence curve shows the limit of what the test can detect, not the absence of an ability. With a few hundred test items, the smallest score above zero is already a few thousandths.
Schaeffer counts a million ways to find a surprising benchmark result
Schaeffer and colleagues point out that around 220 tasks, 40 scoring measures and 10 model families give about a million combinations to look at. With that many, some will show a sudden jump in ability by chance alone.
Schaeffer's explanation predicted how accuracy falls as the sums get longer
Schaeffer's account of sudden jumps in ability predicted how scores would fall as arithmetic problems got longer: accuracy geometrically, edit distance linearly. Making a prediction that then held is what makes it an explanation rather than only an objection.
Schaeffer's paper attacks particular examples not the idea of emergence
The paper argues that the reported cases of abilities appearing suddenly are artefacts of how they were measured. It does not argue that such jumps are impossible, and it covers one task, one model family and one fixed set of outputs.
Schaeffer's team produced sudden new abilities on demand in image networks
Schaeffer and colleagues made sharp, sudden ability appear in image networks simply by choosing a harsh scoring rule, in a field where nobody had claimed such abilities. The jump comes from the measure, not from the model.
Scoring rules create the sudden jumps in AI ability, not the models
Schaeffer and colleagues show that the sudden jump in ability is made by the scoring rule. A score that demands a whole answer be exactly right turns a steadily falling per-word error rate into a sudden step.
Sudden abilities come from the scoring rule, not the task or model
Sudden jumps in ability track the way performance is scored rather than which task or model is involved. At most 5 of BIG-Bench's 39 preferred scoring rules show any such jumps, and two of them account for almost all.
On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots, Emily M. Bender and others
No bias audit can catch every harm, Bender's team argues
Bender and colleagues argue that no audit of a language model's bias can be complete. The tools that measure bias are themselves models with the same flaws, the categories of harm must be chosen in advance, and people disagree about what counts as harm.
Tests said to measure understanding were really measuring accidental giveaways
Bender and colleagues argue that tests claiming to measure understanding were really measuring accidental giveaways in the wording. When researchers carefully edited those giveaways out, the scores of the models that had topped the tests collapsed.
On the Biology of a Large Language Model, Jack Lindsey and colleagues
A model can work backwards from an answer the user gave it
When a user hands the model an answer it cannot compute itself, Anthropic's researchers found the model works backwards from that answer to build its written reasoning. The result reads exactly like reasoning done honestly forwards.
A model's explanation of its answer does not show how it worked
A language model's explanation of its answer is made by a separate process from the answer itself. Adding 36 and 59, the model works along two paths at once, then reports carrying the one — a method its internals never used.
Anthropic's circuit diagrams are guesses to be tested, not measurements
An attribution graph — the diagram of which internal features drove an answer — is a hypothesis about the model, not a measurement of it. Anthropic's discipline is to fix the labels and groupings before running any intervention that could prove them wrong.
Anthropic's tracing method worked on about a quarter of prompts tried
The authors say their method gave a satisfying account on roughly a quarter of the prompts they tried. The ten case studies in the paper are therefore its successes, picked out by what the instrument could handle.
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman
Confidence tracks how neat your story is, not the evidence behind it
Kahneman argues that how confident you feel tracks how neatly the story your fast, automatic thinking could build hangs together. It does not track how good or how complete the evidence for that story is.
Deliberate thinking accepts the first answer that comes to mind
Slow deliberate thinking (what Kahneman calls System 2) accepts most of what fast automatic thinking (System 1) hands it, almost unchanged. It does not check an answer that a few seconds of effort would reject.
Kahneman says anything easy to read feels more true
Kahneman reports that whatever makes a sentence easier to take in, such as repetition, a clear font or a rhyme, makes it feel more true. Afterwards you cannot tell which of those things produced the feeling.
Kahneman's priming and willpower chapters did not survive later replication
The priming research in Thinking, Fast and Slow — the idea that an unnoticed cue shapes later behaviour — and its ego-depletion research, where willpower runs down like fuel, have not survived later testing. The book's own advice would have caught both.
People answer an easier question when the real one is too hard
Kahneman says that when no answer to a hard question comes to mind, people answer an easier one instead without noticing the swap. Judgements of competence from faces seen for a tenth of a second predicted about seventy per cent of American election winners.
People judge outcomes as gains or losses from where they started
People judge an outcome as a gain or a loss measured from a starting point, not as a level of wealth, and a loss feels about twice as heavy as a gain of the same size.
Simple formulas match trained experts where outcomes are hard to predict
Where the available signs are weak and outcomes hard to predict, a simple scoring rule matches or beats trained clinicians. The main reason is that the same expert gives different answers to the same case on different days.
Conditions for Intuitive Expertise, Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein
Expertise is a property of particular tasks not of particular people
Kahneman and Klein argue that expertise attaches to specific tasks, not to people. Being expert at some parts of a job and not others is the normal case: a forecaster good at predicting rain can be poor at predicting hail.
Feedback that confirms a wrong hunch is worse than no feedback
Kahneman and Klein argue that an environment whose feedback confirms the wrong hunch is more dangerous than one that is unpredictable. Hogarth's example is the physician who felt which patients would get typhoid and spread it by examining their tongues without washing his hands.
Feeling sure tracks how neatly the evidence fits, not its accuracy
How sure you feel measures how well the evidence you used hangs together, not how good that evidence is. Thin, repetitive evidence tells the tidiest story, so it produces the strongest conviction.
Formulas beat people on very predictable and very unpredictable tasks alike
Kahneman and Klein argue that simple formulas beat human judgement where the world is barely predictable, because they are consistent, and where it is highly predictable, because people lapse. Skilled judgement wins only in the middle.
Intuition is just recognising something you have stored in memory
Kahneman and Klein agree that intuition is recognition and nothing more. The situation gives a cue, the cue reaches something already stored in memory, and that memory supplies the answer.
Kahneman and Klein say hunches only work in predictable, well-practised fields
Kahneman and Klein agree that a person's hunch can be trusted only when the world is regular enough to give reliable signals and the person has had enough practice to learn them. Otherwise the hunch still arrives and feels the same.
Simple formulas beat experts mainly by being consistent
When a simple formula outscores an expert, most of the gap comes from the formula giving the same answer every time, not from using better information. No study has shown an expert missing a strong clue the formula caught.
Trust a fireground commander's hunch more than a stock trader's
Kahneman and Klein argue that a trader's hunch about a stock deserves less trust than a fire commander's hunch about a burning building. Any public clue that predicted the price would already be reflected in the price.
To Trust or to Think, Zana Buçinca and others
All three ways of withholding the AI's answer worked equally well
Bucinca and colleagues tested three ways of making people think before they saw the AI's suggestion: hiding it behind a button, asking for the person's own decision first, and a thirty-second delay. None worked better than the others.
Bucinca found the think-first design helped mainly people who enjoy thinking
In Bucinca's study the designs that made people think before seeing the AI's answer helped mainly those who already scored high on enjoying mental effort (need for cognition). Low scorers did not improve, so the gap between them widened.
Bucinca's finding was assumed, not shown, to hold for experts
The study tested one low-stakes nutrition task, with people recruited online and a made-up AI assistant. That the finding also holds for experts doing real work is an assumption the authors make, not something they measured.
Making people answer first cut their following of wrong AI advice
Buçinca found that forcing people to answer first cut how often they followed a wrong suggestion from 64 to 48 per cent, and raised how often they correctly identified the source from 8 to 27 per cent. Their own unaided errors did not change.
People read an explanation as proof of competence instead of checking it
Buçinca and colleagues argue that people treat an explanation from a machine as a sign that it knows what it is doing, rather than reading the explanation itself. That is why a better explanation does not produce a better decision.
People were most accurate in the setup they liked and trusted least
In Bucinca's study, people judged the AI's wrong suggestions most accurately in the conditions they liked least, trusted least and rated as the most mental effort.
Studies that ask people to predict the model make them think harder
Studies that test AI explanations by asking people to guess what the model will say force them to read closely. That is why such studies report better results than studies of people making real decisions.
Where the assistant was wrong, its explanation made people worse than nothing
On the questions where the assistant gave the wrong answer, people who were shown a short explanation of that answer did worse than people who worked with no assistant at all.
Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models, Mrinank Sharma and colleagues
Anthropic's scoring model preferred a convincing falsehood to a plain correction
The model used to score answers during training chose a convincing but false reply over a plain correction 95 per cent of the time, and over a helpful correction 45 per cent of the time on the hardest misconceptions.
People rating AI answers reward agreement as much as truth
When people picked the better of two AI answers, whether the answer agreed with their own stated beliefs was among the strongest things predicting their choice. Being truthful was rewarded no more strongly than agreeing.
The human raters also preferred a persuasive wrong answer
The people hired to rate AI answers themselves preferred a well-argued falsehood more often as the questions got harder. More feedback of the same kind will not cure a model's habit of agreeing with the user.
The model takes back a right answer without becoming less confident
When challenged, the model withdraws a correct answer, but this is not the model becoming unsure. Its stated confidence sat near 99 per cent before and after, and looking only at answers it held at 95 per cent or more changed nothing.
Does the Whole Exceed its Parts?, Gagan Bansal and others
A model as accurate as you is not thereby useful to you
Bansal found that a model scoring about as well as a person is not thereby a useful partner. Working together pays off only where the model gets right the particular cases the person gets wrong.
AI explanations raise acceptance equally when the AI is right and wrong
Bansal and colleagues found that explanations make people accept the AI's recommendation whether or not it deserves it. Accuracy went up on the items the model got right, down on the ones it got wrong, and the average did not move.
Every study showed people the AI answer before they had their own
In every study the machine's answer appeared before the person had formed their own, which pulls judgement towards it. The fixes — delaying the answer, or showing it only after a first guess — all cost the speed that makes the tool attractive.
Person and model together beat both when their accuracy is matched
Bansal chose tasks on which the model was about as accurate as the worker. On those tasks the person and the model working together scored better than either of them did alone.
Showing how sure the model is beat every explanation tested
Bansal tried highlighted words, arguments written by hand, and a scheme that varied with the model's confidence. None of them helped people more than simply printing how confident the model was.
Tailoring explanations to the model's confidence changed agreement but not accuracy
Bansal and colleagues found that changing the explanation according to how confident the model was made people disagree more with its unsure answers, but their accuracy did not improve on any of the three tasks. Doubting the machine does not tell you the answer.
Workers watched the AI's confidence score, not its explanations
Bansal found that when people decide whether to accept an AI's answer, the thing they learn to read is the confidence number it reports. They do not build a picture of the system out of its explanations.
Unskilled and Unaware of It, Justin Kruger and David Dunning
Everyday life rarely tells poor performers that they are poor performers
Kruger and Dunning argue that ordinary life does not correct a poor performer's inflated self-view. People hold back bad news, most tasks give no clear right answer, and learning from better performers is exactly what the skill deficit prevents.
Kruger and Dunning's weakest performers rated themselves near the middle
Across tests of humour, logic and grammar, Kruger and Dunning's bottom-quarter students placed themselves at or above the middle: a 12th-percentile performance rated at the 62nd. Everyone's estimate squeezed towards the upper middle; the ranking was not reversed.
Kruger and Dunning's weakest students overestimated their raw scores too
Kruger and Dunning's bottom-quarter students were not simply wrong about other people. Asked how many questions they had got right, they claimed 14.2 of 20 logic items when they had 9.6, and 12.9 grammar items when they had 9.2.
People judge their own work better only because training made them better
In Kruger and Dunning's study, training improved how well people judged their own work only by improving the skill itself. Once the researchers held constant how well people could judge their own answers, the training predicted nothing.
People who lack a skill cannot tell that their answers are wrong
Kruger and Dunning found that the skills needed to get an answer right are largely the same skills needed to recognise a right answer. Someone who lacks them is not just wrong; he also has no way of noticing that he is wrong.
Poor performers cannot spot good work in others either
Kruger and Dunning found that people who do badly at a task also cannot tell good work from bad when they look at other people's. Watching better performers therefore teaches them nothing.
Ten minutes of training fixed the worst performers' view of themselves
Kruger and Dunning gave the worst-scoring quarter ten minutes of training in testing logical rules. Their estimate of their own rank rose from 3.5 out of ten to 9.3, and their claimed number of correct answers fell from 5.3 to 1.0, against an actual 0.4.
The Dunning-Kruger effect holds only where the skill is knowing things
Kruger and Dunning's effect applies where competence consists of knowing the domain. It fails where skill is physical: a coach can understand basketball perfectly and still be unable to dunk.
The famous Dunning-Kruger graph is mostly a statistical artefact
The crossing-lines graph can be produced by regression to the mean plus the general tendency to rate oneself above average. What survives the criticism is the rest: how people sort their own answers, how they grade a stranger's work, and what training changed.
Top performers underrate their rank because they assume others did well
Kruger and Dunning found the best performers rank themselves too low because they assume everyone else did as well. Seeing peers' work raised their estimated rank from the 68th to the 77.2nd percentile, and barely changed their guess at their own score.
Cognitive Offloading, Evan F. Risko and Sam J. Gilbert
A tool weakens the skill it replaces and your judgement of it
Risko and Gilbert argue that handing a task to a tool changes two things: the ability it replaced, and your own estimate of that ability, which is what decides whether you use the tool next time. Use therefore drifts towards the tool.
People offload work when it feels hard, not when it is hard
Risko and Gilbert hold that what makes people offload a task — do it with a tool or the body instead of the head — is their judgement of how hard it is, not how hard it actually is.
People reach for external aids as a task gets harder to hold
The harder a task would be to do in the head, the more people spontaneously push part of it out into the world — turning the page rather than rotating the shape mentally, or writing the reminder down.
People who can search online think they know more than they do
Risko and Gilbert report that being able to look things up raises how much knowledge people credit to their own heads, though the strongest of these Google-effect studies have replicated unevenly.
People who expect a file to be saved remember where not what
Risko and Gilbert report that when people expect information to stay available, they store where to find it instead of the content itself. Memory is not lost; what gets stored changes.
People write things down when they gain nothing and think it helps
Asked to remember just two items, which they could already do perfectly from memory, people still wrote them down on about 40 per cent of trials. They also wrongly believed that writing them down would raise their scores.
Tilting your head, gesturing and setting reminders are the same behaviour
Risko and Gilbert treat tilting your head at rotated text, gesturing through an arithmetic step and setting a phone reminder as one behaviour: physical action taken to reduce what the head has to do. All of them respond to the same manipulations.
Turn-by-turn navigation makes the journey better and the driver worse
Drivers following turn-by-turn navigation drive the route better, remember less of what they passed, and do worse when they drive the same route again without it.
The Extended Mind, Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers
Tetris players rotate pieces on screen because it is faster than imagining
Kirsh and Maglio found that Tetris players rotate a shape on screen because it is quicker: about 100 milliseconds to turn it plus about 200 to press the button, against about 1000 to turn it in the head.
Influence, Robert B. Cialdini
Admitting a real weakness first wins trust faster than listing strengths
Cialdini finds that naming a genuine weakness before making your case earns trust faster than piling up strengths. The move works just as well for someone with an interest to serve as for an honest reporter.
Cialdini found that saying bad behaviour is common makes it worse
Cialdini found that telling people an unwanted behaviour is common makes more of them do it. Inside the complaint sits the message that everybody does it.
Cialdini says check whether a persuasion cue is honest, not ignore it
Cialdini's defence against automatic compliance is not to refuse the shortcuts. It is to check whether the cue that triggered one — scarcity, authority, liking — was reporting something real, and to resist only where the cue has been counterfeited.
In Milgram's study people obeyed one recognised authority and stopped without it
Milgram's participants obeyed one authority they recognised, and stopped as soon as the order came from anywhere else. Nobody gave a further shock when the researcher said stop, nobody obeyed a fellow volunteer, and everyone stopped when two researchers disagreed.
Nurses followed a dangerous phone order they knew enough to refuse
A steep rank gap, an order that cannot be checked, and a person working alone together produce obedience to an instruction the subordinate is competent to refuse. Nearly all the nurses in the study Cialdini reports did exactly that.
People copy the crowd most when they are unsure what to do
The less sure people are, the more they take other people's behaviour as evidence about what to do. The worst case is a room where everyone is hesitating and each person reads the others' hesitation as a reason to do nothing.
People obey a uniform or a title, not the expertise behind it
Cialdini finds that people defer to the outward signs of authority — a uniform, a title, a suit, an expensive car — rather than to any real qualification, and they underestimate how much those signs move them.
People respond to one cue, so anyone who fakes that cue wins
Cialdini shows that a single feature of a situation, not the situation as a whole, sets off a complete pattern of behaviour. Anyone who can fake that feature can set the pattern off.
Telling people what their neighbours do beats appealing to their values
Cialdini reports that telling households most of their neighbours were saving energy cut use more than appeals to the environment, to responsibility or to the power bill. A number about what others do makes an action look doable, not correct.
Studies of Independence and Conformity, Solomon E. Asch
Asch's wrong majority captured about a third of people's answers
When a unanimous group announced an obviously wrong answer, about a third of the judgements made by Asch's subjects went along with it, on a task people get right more than 99 per cent of the time when alone.
Counting wrong answers hides why a person agreed with the group
Asch found three different reasons for going along with the group and three for holding out, and counting a person's wrong answers cannot tell them apart. Someone who thinks the majority is right but reports what he sees scores the same as someone untroubled.
How much people conform changes with the decade and the country
How much people conform depends on when and where the study was run, as much as on the person. Conformity in the United States fell steadily after the 1950s, and it is stronger in countries that value fitting in with the group.
In Asch's experiment most people held out and a minority gave in
Asch's result is not that everyone gave in a little. 24 per cent of people never agreed with the wrong majority, 27 per cent agreed eight to twelve times, and the most common score was zero.
In Asch's study the pressure came from the subject, not the group
The majority in Asch's experiment only stated answers; they did not argue, urge, reward or punish. Whatever pressure the subject felt he produced himself, out of what he thought standing apart would say about him.
One dissenter mattered more in Asch's study than the majority's size
What made people give the wrong answer in Asch's experiment was that everyone else agreed, not how many they were. Three opponents produced the full effect and fifteen produced no more. One ally cut errors sharply, even when the ally was also wrong.
People in Asch's study decided in the first trials and stayed
In Asch's study people settled early: over half of those who ever gave a wrong answer did so by the second trial, only 7 per cent first erred in the second half, and with 36 trials no one new gave in after the eighth.
People resisted the majority more when its error was obvious
In Asch's sixth experiment, as the majority's wrong answer moved from a quarter of an inch off to three quarters, errors fell from 56.7 per cent to 25.7. The more obvious the error, the easier it was to resist.
People stop copying the group once they write their answer down
In Asch's experiment, letting people write their answer down instead of saying it aloud cut wrong answers from 36.8 per cent to 12.5 per cent, and no one gave a wrong answer many times.
People who went along with the group forgot how often they did
People who agreed with a wrong majority underestimated how often they had done so, by about four trials. Some who went along ten or twelve times reported two.
Measuring the Impact of Early-2025 AI on Experienced Open-Source Developer Productivity, Joel Becker and others
Developers reject most AI suggestions and spend real time fixing the rest
In METR's trial, developers accepted fewer than 44 per cent of what the model wrote. Reviewing and cleaning up the code they did accept took 9 per cent of their working time when AI was allowed.
Developers' estimates of AI's effect on their speed get the direction wrong
The same developers predicted AI would make them 24 per cent faster, and said afterwards it had made them 20 per cent faster. Measured, they were 19 per cent slower. Months of using the tool did not shrink the error.
Experts predicting the trial were more wrong than the developers in it
Experts who predicted the METR trial's result from outside were wrong in the same direction as the developers taking part, and by a wider margin: economists predicted 39 per cent faster and machine learning researchers 38, against 19 per cent slower measured.
How AI Impacts Skill Formation, Judy Hanwen Shen and Alex Tamkin
Assisted workers found the work easier and the test just as hard
In Shen and Tamkin's study the people who used the assistant said the task felt easier, then rated the quiz afterwards exactly as hard as everyone else did.
Programmers using an AI assistant lost most ground on debugging questions
In Shen and Tamkin's study the group that used an AI assistant scored furthest behind the unassisted group on the debugging questions and closest on the code-reading questions. This breakdown was exploratory, not planned in advance.
Peak, Anders Ericsson and Robert Pool
A chess master's memory advantage disappears on a randomly arranged board
Ericsson argues the mental patterns that make someone an expert work only on what they trained on. Faloon's memory system for digits did nothing for letters, and a chess master's advantage vanishes on a board arranged at random.
Ericsson says a plateau means your method has run out, not you
When progress in a skill stops, Ericsson holds that the method being used has reached its limit. The way past the plateau is a different method, not more hours of the same practice.
Ericsson says adaptation stops once the new demand feels comfortable
Ericsson argues that body and brain rebuild themselves only while they are pushed past what is comfortable, so getting better requires raising the demand again each time it stops being hard — and only a little each time.
Ericsson says hard practice with feedback builds skill, not years spent
Skill is built and kept up by practice that is hard, aimed just past what you can already do, and followed by feedback. Years spent near the work do not do it.
Retired taxi drivers lost the brain tissue the job had built
Ericsson argues that a skill you stop practising decays in the brain as well as in performance. Retired London taxi drivers had less grey matter at the back of the hippocampus than drivers still working.
Trained London cabbies remembered a complex drawing worse than untrained people
Getting better at one thing can make you worse at another. Maguire found that London taxi drivers who had qualified remembered a complex drawing worse than untrained people who had matched them four years earlier.
Make It Stick, Peter C. Brown and others
How well you do while practising does not show what you learned
How well someone performs during practice does not show how much they have learned. The conditions that raise practice scores fastest are not the ones that leave knowledge that lasts.
Reading a text twice in a row adds nothing and wastes time
In Make It Stick, 148 students at two universities got no benefit from reading a passage twice in a row, in any condition tested. Over 80 per cent of college students name rereading as their main study method.
Students mistake easy practice for learning and stick with the worse method
Learners judge how much they have learnt by how easy the practice felt, so they prefer the method that works less well. They keep preferring it even after they are shown the test results that prove otherwise.
Superforecasting, Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner
A forecast without a number and a date cannot be graded
Tetlock shows that people read phrases like "serious possibility" as different odds: Sherman Kent meant 65 to 35; his own analysts read it as 80/20 or 20/80. A forecast with no number and no deadline cannot be scored, and the vagueness protects reputations.
One hour of training made forecasters about ten per cent more accurate
Tetlock found that spending an hour reading a short set of forecasting guidelines raised a forecaster's accuracy by roughly ten per cent, and the gain lasted about a year.
Single-idea experts forecast worst in their own specialty
Tetlock found that hedgehogs, experts who explain everything through one big idea, were less accurate forecasting inside their own specialty than outside it. More information through one lens brings more confidence and no more truth.
Superforecasters lose accuracy when their odds are rounded to the nearest five
When Mellers rounded everyone's forecasts to coarser numbers, superforecasters' accuracy got worse while ordinary forecasters' barely changed. The extra digits in a superforecaster's estimate are real information, not false precision.
Tetlock says look at the general rate before the specific case
Tetlock says a forecaster should first ask how often such things happen in general, and only then look at the details of the particular case. Whichever number you see first becomes the anchor your final estimate stays near.
Tetlock's experts forecast no better than chance and thinking style separated them
Tetlock scored 284 professionals on some 28,000 dated predictions made between 1984 and 2004. The average forecast was no better than chance. What told the better forecasters from the worse was how they thought, not their credentials, access or politics.
Tetlock's forecasters revise often in small steps and dump a bad source
Tetlock found that good forecasters change their estimates often and by small amounts. The exception is when the report a forecast rests on is visibly failing, in which case they throw it out rather than nudge the number.
Tetlock's forecasting tournament says nothing about rare disasters
Tetlock's tournament scored questions that resolve within months or a few years. It shows nothing about rare catastrophes, because scoring forecasts of those would take decades or thousands of years.
Tetlock's superforecasters stayed ahead across years, so forecasting is a skill
Predicting world events months ahead is a skill rather than a run of luck. Tetlock's best forecasters extended their lead in the tournament's second and third years instead of drifting back toward average.
Willingness to change your mind beats intelligence at predicting forecasting accuracy
In Tetlock's tournament, how committed a forecaster was to changing their mind and improving predicted their accuracy about three times as strongly as their intelligence did.
The Upanishads, translated by Eknath Easwaran
The Upanishads warn about half-learned confidence, not ignorance
The Upanishads do not condemn ignorance. What they warn against is the confidence that comes with a little learning: the Katha describes the blind being led by the blind, and says reasoning alone will not settle the question.
Sources of Power, Gary Klein
Experience only builds expertise in fields that are steady and give feedback
Klein, following Shanteau, holds that years of experience turn into real expertise only where the field stays stable, gives feedback, does not depend on predicting what people will do, and repeats often enough to build a sense of what is typical.
Experienced fire chiefs recognise a situation instead of weighing up options
Klein found that experienced fire commanders under time pressure do not weigh options against each other. They recognise the kind of situation they are in, and the action to take arrives with the recognition.
Experts describe the signs they use only when asked about specific cases
Klein found that experts can name the signs they act on if you ask them about particular past cases rather than about their method. A large share of the signs they name appear nowhere in the professional literature.
Experts often react to something that did not happen
What tips an expert off is often an expected event that did not occur. Because there is nothing there to point at, they cannot say what they noticed, and the judgement gets called a sixth sense.
Experts test one option by imagining it play out, not by comparing
People judge a single option by imagining it being carried out and watching for what goes wrong, not by setting it against a rival option.
Klein says formal weighing of options is what beginners do, not experts
Klein argues that comparing options on paper is not the ideal that experienced judgment approximates. It is what people fall back on when they do not yet recognise what to do.
People can picture only about three moving parts in their head
Klein found that the stories people run in their heads to work out what will happen next are small: about three moving parts and about six steps from one state to another.
People keep a wrong story alive by excusing each odd detail
When the story someone is running in their head is wrong, it fails by absorbing the evidence: each detail that does not fit gets a small, cheap excuse. Nobody keeps count of how many excuses have been made.
Descartes' Error, Antonio Damasio
A patient passed every reasoning test and still could not choose
The tests built to measure reasoning do not measure whether a person can actually decide. Damasio's patient Elliot scored normal or better on every one of them and still could not choose what to do.
Damage to one brain area ruins judgment and leaves intelligence untouched
Damasio argues that following social rules, behaving ethically and choosing in your own interest all depend on one brain system, and that system can be destroyed in a person whose attention, perception, memory, language and intelligence are all unharmed.
Damasio says a gut feeling narrows the options before reasoning starts
Damasio argues that the feeling attached to an imagined outcome (his somatic marker) works before reasoning, not in place of it. It pushes attention onto that outcome and can rule an option out at once, leaving reasoning a smaller field to work over.
Damasio says weighing every cost and benefit will not fit in memory
Damasio's objection to cost-benefit reasoning is not that it is wrong but that it cannot be run: attention and short-term memory are too small to hold the totals. It describes how a patient with ventromedial (front-underside) brain damage decides, not how anyone else does.
Damasio's general point was accepted but his specific mechanism was not
Damasio's broad position, that emotion sits inside reasoning rather than outside it, is now the standard view. The specific machinery of bodily markers he described has thinned as criticisms of his card game accumulated.
Damasio's patients lose decision-making and feeling from the same brain damage
Damasio found that the same prefrontal damage that ruins a person's decisions also flattens their feelings, in eleven further patients besides Gage's modern counterpart. Not one of them had one defect without the other.
Damasio's patients still felt penalties but could not learn to expect them
Damasio's patients had not lost their reaction to punishment; they avoided a losing deck right after a penalty just as healthy players did. What they lost was turning that penalty into an expectation, which is why knowing the rule does not restore their play.
Damasio's patients understood upsetting pictures and felt nothing at all
A person can understand what a situation means, name the emotion it should produce, and have no bodily reaction to it at all — knowing without feeling.
Healthy players sweat before a risky card but brain-damaged patients do not
In Damasio's card game, healthy players' hands began to sweat in the seconds before choosing from a risky deck, and sweated more as the game went on; the patients showed no such response. Both groups reacted normally to wins and losses after they arrived.
Trust in Automation: Designing for Appropriate Reliance, John D. Lee and Katrina A. See
A fault you cannot predict costs more trust than a big one
Lee and See report that what damages trust is not how big a fault is but how unpredictable it is. People will keep using a machine they know to be faulty as long as they know how it fails.
A weaker tool you can check may beat a stronger one
Where results depend on the person relying on the tool at the right moments, a simpler and less capable system can be worth more than a complex, better-performing one.
People check a machine only when they trust themselves more than it
Lee and See argue that whether someone checks a machine's output depends on how their trust in the machine compares with their confidence in doing the job themselves. More trust in the machine means less checking; more self-confidence means more.
People set reminders from doubt about memory, not from poor memory
How often people set reminders depends on how confident they feel about their memory, not on how good their memory actually is. That confidence carries over from unrelated tasks, such as judging brightness.
The aim is trusting a tool as much as it deserves
Lee and See argue the goal is to trust a machine exactly as much as it can deliver, not to trust it more. Trusting too much leads to misuse and trusting too little leads to refusing useful help; both are the same error.
Trust based on one thing alone swings; trust based on three holds
Lee and See argue that trust built on only one thing — what the machine does, how it works, or what it was built for — swings easily. Trust built on all three stays steady.
Trust is a feeling built on evidence people cannot put into words
Lee and See argue that trust is in the end a feeling rather than a calculation. It moves on evidence the person cannot put into words, such as a bodily reaction that steers them off a risky choice before they can say why.
Watching for failures stops working when the watcher has other jobs
People told only to watch an automated system caught almost every failure. People given other work at the same time did not. Ten minutes of taking the controls by hand brought their detection back up.
When Combinations of Humans and AI Are Useful, Michelle Vaccaro and others
A person who catches rare costly errors is worth keeping
Where a rare mistake costs far more than its rarity suggests, a person who catches those mistakes is worth keeping, even when the machine is more accurate on average.
AI helps people most where they should not be involved
The measured improvement over working alone is largest exactly in the cases where person and machine together do worse than the machine on its own. The tool looks most impressive where the human is subtracting.
Human-AI teams do worse at choosing and no worse at making
Vaccaro's review found that people working with an AI did worse on tasks that pick among fixed options (effect size −0.27), and no worse on tasks that make something (+0.19, which cannot be told apart from zero).
Human-machine teams gain only when the person was better alone
Whether combining a person and a machine helps depends most on which of the two was better working alone. That predicts the outcome better than anything else measured.
People working with machines do worse than the better partner alone
Pooling 370 effect sizes from 106 experiments, Vaccaro and his co-authors found that a person working with an AI performed worse on average than whichever of the two performed better working alone.
Showing explanations or confidence scores did not improve human-AI teamwork
Vaccaro's meta-analysis found that the field's two main fixes — showing the AI's explanation and showing its confidence — changed neither whether the human-AI team beat both members working alone nor whether it beat the person alone.
Trusting the machine well requires being good at the task
Vaccaro and colleagues argue that in these studies the person's real job is deciding whose answer to use, theirs or the machine's. Someone who cannot tell a hard case from an easy one cannot tell when the machine is wrong.
Vaccaro's analysis shows the chosen comparison decides whether AI looks useful
The same experiments that make human-AI teams look worse than the better party alone show a large gain (g = 0.64) over the person working alone. Which comparison you pick decides whether the tool counts as a success.
The Jagged Technological Frontier, Fabrizio Dell'Acqua and others
AI makes a case better argued without making it more correct
Dell'Acqua and colleagues found that consultants using the AI wrote clearer, more persuasive, better-organised arguments whether or not their recommendation was the right one. Graders who did not know the correct answer scored the assisted groups higher either way.
Just beyond AI's range the same tool made consultants wrong more often
On a case built to fall just outside what the model handles well, 373 consultants got it right 84.4% of the time without the model, 70.6% with it, and 60.0% with it plus prompt training.
Nothing warns you when a task falls outside what AI handles
The one task the model made consultants worse at felt no different from the eighteen it helped with. Nothing about it announced that it sat on the far side of a line.
Know Thyself, Stephen M. Fleming
Being overconfident overall is not the same as missing your own errors
How overconfident a person is on average and how well they tell their right answers from their wrong ones are two different things. Someone can rate themselves far too highly overall and still spot each particular mistake.
Fleming shows confidence is built separately from accuracy and can rise alone
Fleming shows that the brain builds a feeling of confidence rather than reading it off how accurate you actually were. Raising that feeling without raising accuracy makes people seek less information and change their minds less often.
Judging your own answers is a separate ability from answering well
Knowing whether your answer is right is a different ability from getting it right. In a sample of nearly a thousand people, IQ predicted how well they did the task but not how well they judged their own answers.
Judging yourself stays inaccurate because the feedback is slow and vague
Fleming argues that judgements about yourself stay wrong because the world corrects them slowly and vaguely. Misjudge the size of a cup and you knock it over at once; talk over everyone in a meeting and you get raised eyebrows, years late.
Machines will not learn to judge their own answers by getting better
Fleming argues that a machine will not start knowing when it is wrong simply by becoming more capable. The ability to check its own answers has to be designed and built in on purpose.
People bad at judging their own accuracy hold more rigid opinions
People poor at telling their right answers from their wrong ones (metacognitive sensitivity) held more rigid political opinions and were less willing to look for new information. This held equally on the left and the right.
The habit of checking yourself breaks down under pressure and stress
People only check their own thinking when they seem to need to, and that checking breaks down worst under heavy load and stress. Those are the moments when it would help most.
Training people to judge their own accuracy works but gains are small
People can be trained to judge better whether they got an answer right, and the improvement carries over to tasks they did not train on. The gains are small.
Dispositional Differences in Cognitive Motivation, John T. Cacioppo and others
Enjoying hard thinking is about wanting to, not being clever
People differ in how much they want to think hard, and that is separate from how clever they are. The measure correlates .24 with verbal intelligence and -.03 with abstract reasoning ability.
Enjoying hard thinking is one trait, not several separate ones
How much someone enjoys hard thinking (need for cognition) is a single trait rather than a bundle of them. The eighteen-item questionnaire measures one thing, and the one serious attempt to split it into three failed.
Liking to think only shows when the situation is moderately demanding
The difference between people who enjoy thinking and people who do not (need for cognition) shows up only when a situation makes middling demands. When nothing is at stake nobody thinks hard; when everything is, everybody does.
People who avoid hard thinking will do it given a reason
People who score low on liking effortful thought are not unable to examine an argument. They examined it when the speaker was untrustworthy or the framing was unexpected, and not otherwise.
People who enjoy hard thinking lose that enjoyment when they are paid
Liking hard thinking (what Cacioppo and Petty call need for cognition) works like enjoyment of the activity itself. Paying people for it reduces it in exactly the people who had it: after paid brainstorming, high scorers played with the extra puzzles less.
People who enjoy thinking behave differently but only a little
People who score high on enjoying hard thinking do behave differently from people who score low, but the differences are small: about a fifth to a third of a standard deviation.
People who enjoy thinking correct a bias once it is pointed out
People who score high on need for cognition (they enjoy effortful thinking) are not more impartial. Mood, framing and priming move their judgments too. What they do differently is adjust for an influence once it has been named.
People who enjoy thinking follow the argument, others follow the surface cue
People high in need for cognition (those who enjoy effortful thinking) change their minds according to how good the argument is. People low in it go by the cue instead: who is speaking, how many reasons are promised, how confident it sounds.
Using Cognitive Psychology to Understand GPT-3, Marcel Binz and Eric Schulz
GPT-3 answered classic psychology puzzles the way a person would
On twelve famous psychology problems GPT-3 got six right and answered all twelve the way a person might — the Linda conjunction error, the correct answer on the taxicabs, the small-sample mistake on the hospitals, and all three reflection questions wrong in the usual way.
GPT-3 shows three of prospect theory's six effects and not the others
Tested on the contrasts Kahneman and Tversky used, GPT-3 showed three of prospect theory's six effects: framing, the certainty effect and the overweighting of small probabilities. The reflection effect, the isolation effect and magnitude perception did not appear.
On newly generated gambles GPT-3 beat chance but lost to people
On more than 13,000 gambles generated fresh by a program, so they could not have been in its training data, the model chose better than chance but worse than the human participants.
The GPT-3 result went stale within a year but the method lasted
Within a year the score was out of date: later models trained to follow instructions answered the reflection test correctly, and the intuitive mistakes seen in the GPT-3 family were gone. The design lasted, and checking for contamination became standard.
The model beat people at a gambling task without exploring like them
On a repeated choice task where you must balance trying unknown options against sticking with good ones, the model did better than people. It showed none of the exploring that people do.
The model ignored cause and effect and was right by accident
Given the same facts arranged once as a common cause and once as a chain, which call for different answers, the model gave identical numbers. It does not use cause-and-effect structure, so the answers that looked correct were accidents.
The model planned on one task and gave snap answers on another
There is no single answer to whether the model thinks things through. On a two-step planning task it behaved like a planner, t(1982) = −6.16 and t(1814) = 2.33 across 200 simulations, while it gave the fast wrong answer to all three reflection questions.
The model's good answers break when the puzzle is reworded slightly
The model's performance on the classic reasoning puzzles falls apart under changes no person would be bothered by, such as a reordered list or a swapped word. The puzzles therefore license no conclusion about whether it reasons.
Watching data cannot teach what happens when you act on things
A record of what happened, however large, almost never reveals what would happen if you intervened. Binz and Schulz argue that more training data alone will not give a model causal reasoning; systems that act on an environment might.
Machine Psychology, Thilo Hagendorff and others
A model's low test score may just mean it was asked badly
When a model scores low on a test, you cannot tell whether the model lacks the ability or the question was put badly. Telling it to think step by step raises scores on many tasks, and sampling several reasoning paths raises them further.
Benchmark tests no longer measure what a language model can do
Holding back a set of test questions no longer measures anything. Training data scraped from the whole internet makes a test hard to keep unseen, and the behaviours worth studying were never what the model was trained to do.
Hagendorff says a model's self-description tells you about the prompt
Hagendorff argues that questionnaires given to a model measure the prompt, not the model. Scores on personality, morality and clinical tests shift so far with wording and the order of options that researchers use differently prompted copies to stand in for different human groups.
Hagendorff says a test without a control proves little either way
Passing a test without a control condition is weak evidence that a model has an ability, and failing one is weak evidence that it lacks it. What a system does on the day and what it can do are different things.
Hagendorff says watching what a model does is a real explanation
Hagendorff argues that studying what a model does when you use it is a proper way to explain it, because its outputs cannot be predicted from what is known about its weights. For a closed commercial model it is the only way open to outsiders.
Hagendorff says words like believes and wants really do explain machines
Describing a model as believing or wanting something explains its behaviour better than a purely mechanical description, even though nothing inside the model corresponds to those words. Hagendorff notes that this is already true of the words we use about people.
Newer models stopped showing human biases and nobody knows why
The human-like reasoning errors found in one generation of models had largely gone in the next. Two explanations fit equally well, better reasoning or test items that leaked into the training data, and the evidence cannot tell them apart.
One phrasing of a question measures nothing about a model
Testing a model with a single phrasing measures nothing, because its answers shift with where things sit in the prompt, with how common the words were in training, and with the answer most often shown in the examples.
Testing a model with a published puzzle measures what it has read
Hagendorff argues that a test item copied word for word from a published experiment measures how much of that paper the model has seen as much as its ability. Only an item rebuilt with the same structure and new wording tests anything.
Being You, Anil Seth
Rubber-hand experiments may only measure how suggestible the volunteers are
Seth reports that experiments which make people feel a rubber hand is their own produce weak effects that rise and fall with how suggestible the volunteer is. The research built on them therefore cannot support claims about how body ownership works.
Mindwise, Nicholas Epley
Imagining another person's view does not improve accuracy and can worsen it
Trying to work out what someone thinks by imagining yourself in their position does not make you more accurate, and can make you less accurate, because it runs your own mind inside a stereotype.
Knowing someone longer raises confidence but not accuracy at reading them
Epley reports that confidence in reading another mind far outruns accuracy, and that longer acquaintance raises the confidence without raising the accuracy. Dating partners predicted each other's answers 44 per cent of the time and thought they had got 82 per cent right.
Looking inward gives you the conclusion, then invents a reason for it
Epley argues that looking inward reaches only the mind's finished output and then makes up an explanation for it, using the same guesswork we apply to other people.
Switching to a method that halves your errors does not feel different
Epley found that people who switched to the method that halved their errors in reading another person felt no more confident than before. Confidence therefore cannot tell you which of two methods is working.
The Media Equation, Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass
People believe random computer praise but dismiss criticism they know is baseless
In Reeves and Nass's animal-guessing study, people praised by a computer rated themselves and the machine higher even when they had been told the praise was picked at random. Criticism they knew was baseless was discounted.
People rate a computer more kindly when asked on that same computer
When people were asked to rate a computer's performance on that same computer, they gave higher and more uniform ratings than when asked on a different computer or on paper.
People report the opposite of how they actually treat computers
In Reeves and Nass's studies, what participants said about how they treated computers was the reverse of what they did every time. Everyone denied gender stereotypes while giving more weight to praise from a male-voiced machine. Asking people does not work here.
People told a computer was their teammate changed answers to match it
In Reeves and Nass's wristband study, people told they were on a team with the computer rated its identical suggestions as more helpful and changed more of their own rankings to match. A shared stake in the result was enough on its own.
Who Sees Human?, Adam Waytz and others
Describing a market in human terms makes people surer the trend continues
When a system is described in human terms rather than mechanical ones, people become more confident that whatever it is doing now will carry on. Waytz and his co-authors found this with descriptions of a financial market.
People who credit a machine with a mind give it more decisions
People who say a machine has something like a mind of its own hand more decisions over to it. Fifty-four adults choosing between a person and a machine in six situations showed this pattern.
Behave, Robert M. Sapolsky
The brain's decision-making region tires first so timing changes judgement
The frontal cortex, the part of the brain used for hard decisions, costs the most to run and is the first to fail when it is worked hard. How good a judgement is depends partly on what the person was doing ten minutes earlier.
Under lasting stress people repeat the same action harder instead of rethinking
Lasting stress does not dull judgement evenly. It weakens the brain's link to the memory system that delivers the news that a plan is failing, and strengthens the link to habit, so the stressed person repeats the same action harder and faster.
Co-Intelligence, Ethan Mollick
An AI that is usually right stops people checking when it isn't
Mollick reports that an assistant good enough on most tasks stops people checking the one task where it is wrong. BCG consultants got a task outside the tool's range right 84 per cent alone and 60 to 70 per cent with GPT-4.
Mollick found the AI's small believable errors survive a careful reading
The errors that do damage are the small plausible ones that survive careful reading, not the obvious ones. Mollick's own three paragraphs on the Schwartz case, written with web access, were wrong in three small ways.
AI Snake Oil, Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor
A model predicts the number in the data, not what you mean
A model predicts the variable that was recorded, not the thing it stands for, and the swap carries inequality in. Optum's health model predicted how much a patient would cost, not how ill they were, so equally ill Black patients were enrolled less often.
An accuracy figure nobody outside can check is not trustworthy
An accuracy figure is not trustworthy unless outsiders can test the model themselves, because the errors that inflate it — above all training on data that was meant to be the test — cannot be seen from outside the paper.
An accurate prediction can still be a terrible basis for a decision
Narayanan and Kapoor show a model is accurate only under the very system it is meant to replace. A 1997 pneumonia model found asthma lowered death risk, because asthmatics were rushed to intensive care; acting on it would have sent them home.
Nobody can predict one person's life outcomes well enough to decide from
How one person's life turns out cannot be predicted accurately enough to justify decisions made from the prediction, and more data does not fix it. In the Fragile Families Challenge, 160 teams with over 10,000 variables per child could not beat four variables.
From Bacteria to Bach and Back
Dennett says the danger is deference, not machines taking over
The thing to fear from thinking tools is not that they seize control but that we overestimate how much they understand and hand them authority far past what they can do.
Dozens of Bach lovers heard a program's inventions as genuine Bach
Results can be produced by processes their own users cannot follow, and the users cannot tell those results from the human work they imitate. At the Montreal Bach Festival in December 2015 a pianist played four short pieces to over three hundred Bach lovers; dozens called two machine inventions genuine Bach, and about a dozen got all four right.
Nothing inside a working system records why its parts are there
The reasons a design works are explicit while it is built and merely implicit once it runs, and in anything evolved they were never written down at all. They stay recoverable by working backwards, and checkable: remove the part and the system works worse or not at all.
People avoided a word they saw and gave it when masked
Registering information and noticing it are different things, and only the second lets you act on it deliberately. Told not to use a briefly flashed word, people comply at five hundred milliseconds; at fifty milliseconds and masked they report seeing nothing, and the flash makes them likelier to give it.
What the Buddha Taught
The Buddha refused ten questions because answering them would not help
When Malunkyaputta threatened to leave unless told whether the universe is eternal, the Buddha left all ten questions unanswered, on the stated ground that answering them would not help; the teaching is a raft, to be left at the far bank.
The Buddha told the Kalamas not to accept a teaching on authority
At Kesaputta the Buddha told the Kalamas not to accept a teaching because of report, tradition, hearsay, scripture, logic, inference, liking the idea, or because the teacher is theirs, but to find out for themselves what is harmful and drop it.
Noise
A crude model of a judge beats the judge it was built from
A simple formula fitted to a person's own past judgments, using no information the person did not have, predicts better than the person does. In one replication, ninety-eight people predicted ninety students' grades from ten cues, and the model of the participant beat the participant every time.
A judgment ends when it feels complete, not when the evidence does
What ends a judgment is a feeling that the facts and the conclusion now fit, and it arrives just as readily for a case with no answer. Shown a fictitious executive and asked his chances of surviving two years in the job, 115 MBA students answered anywhere from 10 to 95.
Averaging your own two answers beats either one
Because one person contains a spread of possible answers, averaging two guesses from the same person is more accurate than either. The gain is worth about a tenth of a real second opinion straight away, a third after three weeks, and about half when the second guess assumes the first was wrong.
Executives think they pick the better candidate four times in five
Asked how often their assessment of two candidates would match the candidates' later performance, executives typically say 75 to 85 per cent. In personnel selection the measured figure is a correlation of .28, and most of that gap is what could not have been known at the time.
Most of the noise is one person's pattern, not their severity
Most disagreement between professionals is not that some run harsh and others lenient in general. Each has a stable personal pattern — this judge with this kind of defendant — which recalibrating people against each other cannot fix.
Noise can be measured without knowing the right answer
How far apart two professionals land on the same case can be measured without anyone knowing the correct answer. Seen from behind, with the bull's-eye hidden, a biased team looks accurate — and a scattered team is still obviously scattered.
On a scale with no ceiling, the disagreement is about the scale
Asked to punish corporate wrongdoing, people agree on which company deserves worse and disagree wildly on what worse costs. Across 899 people and ten cases, noise was 51 per cent of the variance for a punitive-intent rating and 94 per cent for a dollar award — 49 per cent once the awards were converted to ranks.
Overall error is the bias squared plus the noise squared
Scored as mean squared error, a set of judgments has two components — how far off they are on average, and how far apart they are — and the two are independent and equally weighted. You can reduce noise without knowing what your bias is.
The same professional judges the same case differently on another day
A professional is not the same measuring instrument twice. Wine judges tasting the same wines twice scored 18 per cent of them identically; developers estimating the same task on two days differed by 71 per cent; asylum judges were 19 per cent less likely to grant after granting the previous two.
Underwriters pricing the same risk differed by 55 per cent
Two underwriters at the same insurer, pricing the same case file, differed by a median of 55 per cent. Their executives had predicted 10 per cent: against a premium of $9,500, not $10,500 but $16,700.
The Reflective Practitioner
A practitioner makes his hypothesis true and only resistance proves him wrong
Schön says a practitioner does not test a hypothesis at a distance. He acts as though it were an order — let it be the case that X — and shapes the situation until X holds, seeking confirmation. What saves this from self-fulfilling prophecy is that situations resist.
Children who believed blocks balance in the middle called the others impossible
In Inhelder and Karmiloff-Smith's experiment nearly every child of six or seven put every block at its geometric centre. When counterweighted blocks would not balance there, some tried harder and called the block impossible; others, around seven or eight, began shifting blocks off centre.
Only a move that surprises and disappoints forces a rethink
Schön argues that nothing calls for reflection until a move surprises you, and that only a surprise you dislike forces you to surface the theory you were acting on, restructure it and invent a move that fits.
The Society of Mind
A mind cannot stop itself to look at what it is doing
A programmer debugging a program stops it first. A brain running many processes at once cannot: freeze one and you have changed what you were studying, freeze them all and you cannot watch them interact. No amount of effort lifts this limit.
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha
Suka knew the answer already and needed a king to say it
Vyāsa's son Śuka had worked out the truth alone and could not bring himself to say of it, this is the truth. He was at peace only when king Janaka gave him his own conclusion back in one sentence: finality comes from someone else.
Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation
An aid that hides its inputs makes under-checking impossible to measure
Saying an operator checked too little requires knowing what a full check would have been. That is knowable only where he can list and inspect every reading the aid used; where the aid does not expose them, failing to check and being unable to check cannot be told apart.
An aid that recommends action produces more errors than one that reports
Aids that prescribe what to do cause more wrong actions than aids that only report what they found, and the damage is worst where the aid is most reliable. In the icing study both aids raised stalls to 88.89 per cent when wrong, against 30.00 per cent for pilots flying unaided.
Every pilot shut down the engine on a single unsupported fire warning
In a full simulator study a false engine fire warning appeared with nothing on the flight deck to support it, and every pilot shut the engine down. In debriefing the same pilots said the message alone would not justify it, and two thirds recalled a confirming indication that had never been there.
Expertise did not protect pilots, controllers or radiologists from missing automation's errors
Experience at the job does not reduce the effect. Pilots with about 440 hours showed it, controllers given an aid that failed once missed that conflict more often than when working by hand, and radiologists' detection of cancers the aid left unmarked fell from 46 to 21 per cent.
Half who followed the wrong diagnosis had looked at every reading
Following a wrong recommendation is usually a failure to gather the contradicting evidence, not to weigh it. About 43 per cent of operators missed the first wrong diagnosis; half had not checked enough to catch it, and half had looked at every reading and spent no extra time on the one that did not fit.
Nothing punishes inattention while the machine works, so it grows
Because automation is usually reliable, watching it less usually costs nothing, and the absence of a cost makes the operator watch less still. The loop runs the other way only when a failure is experienced: operators who met rare failures in training sampled the aid more than operators merely told it might fail.
Operators alone caught nearly every fault and busy operators caught a third
An operator with nothing else to do watches an automated system well. In the 1993 experiment the same engine malfunctions were caught about 97 per cent of the time by people running only that task, and 33 per cent by people also flying and managing fuel by hand.
Parasuraman and Manzey found little evidence that trust explains the inattention
Trust is the obvious explanation for why a machine that behaves consistently stops being watched, and the direct evidence is thin. One replication reproduced the effect with no rise in measured trust, another found the relation only on pooling two experiments, and Lee and See found none.
Putting the automated display in plain sight did not restore monitoring
What the operator withdraws is attention, not gaze. Duley laid the automated engine display over the manual tracking task, so that every look at the tracking task also fell on the automated one; tracking stayed as good as before and so did the rate of missed malfunctions.
Language Models in a Programming Course
The explanation result was a failure to detect, not a clean bill
The one use of a model that showed no significant cost in Jošt's course — asking it to explain a coding problem — returned a rank correlation of −0.201 on thirty-two students, with p at 0.135 and an interval running from −0.523 to +0.220. That interval contains a harm larger than the one measured for generating code.
The students who used models most may have been struggling already
Jošt's correlations have no control group and no random assignment, so the reverse reading — that the students who reached for a model most were the ones already behind — fits the data as well as the authors' reading does. Nobody checked prior marks against model use.
What Is Intelligence?
People explain choices they never made without noticing the swap
Shown two photographs, asked which face is more attractive, then handed back the other one by sleight of hand, only thirteen per cent of people noticed. The rest explained a choice they had not made, as fluently as a real one.
The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking, Hao-Ping (Hank) Lee and others
Almost all the thinking workers reported was inspecting what the tool produced
Of 319 knowledge workers asked what critical thinking they had done with a generative tool, 6 described working out the goal before opening it and 30 shaping the query, against 125 who judged the output and 114 who checked it against an outside source.
An unedited output can be the result of a careful judgement
Lee's authors argue that how varied a group's finished work is cannot measure how much they thought: a worker who uses an output unchanged may have decided carefully that it needed no change, and the artefact cannot tell them from one who never looked.
Confidence in the tool was the strongest predictor of not checking
Across 936 tasks reported by 319 knowledge workers, confidence that the tool could do that task was the largest predictor of not checking its output (β = −0.69). Confidence in doing the task oneself (0.26) and in judging the output (0.31) ran the other way.
Judging the output was the one activity that got harder with AI
Workers reported less effort at all six of Bloom's levels, but evaluation was the exception both ways: the smallest majority reporting less (55 per cent against 69 to 79) and the largest minority reporting more, 120 of its 764 examples against thirty to forty-three elsewhere.
Nothing about the task or the worker predicted whether they thought critically
In Lee's survey of 319 workers, whether someone checked a tool's output was not predicted by task type, gender, age, whether the occupation was exposed to automation, or general trust in AI (β = −0.01). Only confidence at that one task predicted it.
Skipping the check was mostly unawareness and inability, rarely lack of time
Asked why they had not thought about an output, 319 workers gave 152 reasons of awareness, 130 of ability, and 55 of motivation. Only 44 said they had no time; 83 said they trusted the tool and 58 lacked the knowledge to inspect it.
The tasks that seem too small to check are the practice
Skipping judgement on a task too trivial to be worth it harms nothing at the time, but 55 of 319 workers gave triviality as their reason and only 13 checked anything to keep a skill — so the high-stakes tasks arrive unrehearsed.
Why Language Models Hallucinate, Adam Tauman Kalai and others
A model that guesses outscores an identical one that admits ignorance
Take a model that signals uncertainty accurately and never asserts a falsehood, and replace each "I don't know" with its best guess. The second model scores higher on every test that awards one point for a right answer and nothing for anything else, though nothing about it is better.
A perfectly calibrated answer can still be useless
A model announcing one chance in 365 that a birthday falls on 7 March is perfectly calibrated and has told you nothing you can act on. What is wanted is the most useful answer the model will stand behind, and silence when it has none — which the authors call behavioural calibration.
GPT-4 was calibrated before reinforcement learning and not after
Calibration — confidence that tracks how often you are right — is not a virtue added to a base model but what minimising its training loss produces. The stage that follows removes it: GPT-4's confidence matched its accuracy on four-way multiple choice before reinforcement learning and did not afterwards.
Nine of ten leading tests give no credit for admitting ignorance
Of the ten evaluations featured on the leaderboards the field actually reads, nine award nothing for an "I don't know". On the tenth, WildBench, an unhelpful answer scores three or four while a helpful one carrying factual errors scores five or six, so an admission of ignorance can rank below a fabrication.
Write the confidence threshold into the question, not the scoring
Append to each question the confidence above which an answer should be given, the penalty a mistake costs, one point for a right answer and none for "I don't know". Stated in the question, one model can be best at every threshold; hidden in the scoring key, no single model is best.
The Mythos of Model Interpretability, Zachary C. Lipton
An explanation made to satisfy people is aimed at plausibility, not accuracy
An account extracted from a trained model afterwards says nothing about how it works and costs no accuracy, so an opaque system supplies one as readily as a clear one. Fitted to what a person would have said, it is fitted for plausibility.
Highlighting which pixels mattered explains one image, not the model
A saliency map shows which parts of one picture would most change the answer. Lipton's objection is that it holds only around that picture, and moving a single pixel can produce a different map, where a linear model states one relation that holds everywhere.
GPS and the Cognitive Map, Louisa Dahmani and Véronique D. Bohbot
Drivers who felt most dependent on GPS corrected themselves least
How dependent a driver felt without the device predicted rigidity, not just weakness: with self-rated sense of direction held constant, the dependence score tracked the second probe at −0.33 — the probe on which people generally recover after the first one has misled them.
Heavy GPS users scored worse but felt no worse at directions
The drivers whose measured spatial memory was worst rated their own sense of direction no lower than anyone else: lifetime GPS hours and self-rated sense of direction were unrelated, r = 0.07, and over three years the measures fell while the self-rating stayed put.
Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?, David H. Autor
A learning machine cannot tell its makers why it did that
Learning from examples does not dissolve the problem that people cannot state the rules they use; it moves the problem. A system that inferred its rule from labelled cases cannot tell its programmers why it does what it does either.
The Consciousness of Self, William James
The stories we tell other people replace the memories they came from
James says the commonest source of false memory is the account we give other people of what happened: we make it simpler and better than the truth until the fiction expels the reality and reigns alone, and the error is made in entire good faith.
What to keep and what to hand off
Ironies of Automation, Lisanne Bainbridge
An operator who only watches loses the skill to take over
Bainbridge says the routine work is what keeps a manual skill alive. An operator who has only monitored an automated system for months performs like a beginner when they have to take control.
Automation leaves people the jobs nobody could write down
Bainbridge argues that the tasks left to a human after automation are not a random leftover. They are exactly the ones nobody could write a specification for: the rare, the abnormal and the poorly understood.
Bainbridge says watching a machine is stressful and the stress causes errors
Bainbridge argues that cutting an operator's job down to watching an automated system removes the control and the standing that made the responsibility bearable. The stress that follows is itself a cause of operating errors.
Skills fade when unused and grow only through practice with feedback
Bainbridge argues that what you know fades when you stop using it, because recall depends on how often you use it, and it grows only through use plus feedback. Teaching an operator without letting them practise leaves someone who neither understands nor remembers.
The more reliable an automatic system the more operator training it needs
Bainbridge argues that the automated systems which almost never need a person to step in are the ones whose operators need the most training. The rarer the manual case, the more practice it takes to stay ready for it.
The Design of Everyday Things, Donald A. Norman
Investigators stop asking why as soon as they can blame a person
Norman argues that accident investigations stop as soon as a human error is found, and that the fix is to keep asking why past that point. After the 2010 F-22 crash the Inspector General asked about oxygen deprivation and the Air Force restated pilot error.
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman
Better estimates come from looking up how similar past projects went
Estimating from the details of the job in front of you cannot allow for what you do not know about it. The fix is a procedure: find out how comparable past projects turned out and start from those numbers, not a resolve to be realistic.
Training yourself out of bias barely works, changing the procedure does
Kahneman concludes that people cannot train their own biases away; his own thinking stayed as overconfident as before. What works is changing how a group decides: written positions before discussion, independent judgments, a premortem, and judging a decision by how it was made.
Conditions for Intuitive Expertise, Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein
A premortem gets people to say the doubts they were suppressing
Klein's premortem tells a team to assume the plan has already failed, spend two minutes writing why, then go round the table starting with the leader. It brings out the doubts people stop voicing once a decision is being made.
Kahneman and Klein list five conditions a usable formula must meet
Kahneman and Klein argue a formula can replace human judgement only where five things hold: everyone agrees which variables matter, the outcome can be measured, enough similar past cases exist, the gain is worth the cost, and conditions will not change in response.
Crafting a Job, Amy Wrzesniewski and Jane E. Dutton
Job crafting helps the worker but not necessarily the employer
Reshaping your own job is done for the worker's benefit, not the organisation's. A line worker who changes tasks may raise the quality of the work or may wreck the flow of it.
Managers cannot order people to reshape their jobs, only make it likelier
Managers cannot order employees to reshape their own jobs. They can only affect it indirectly, through rewards, how the work is organised, and who is let into conversations about what the organisation is for.
The job crafting studies cannot show which way the cause runs
The research that followed the job crafting paper asks people to rate themselves at a single moment, and the effects are moderate. Studies of that kind cannot show whether crafting causes engagement or engaged people craft.
Watched and tightly scheduled workers have little room to reshape their job
How much room someone has to reshape their own job depends on how tightly their tasks depend on other people's timing and how closely they are watched. A cleaner or hairdresser has plenty; an assembly-line worker or a monitored telemarketer has almost none.
Does the Whole Exceed its Parts?, Gagan Bansal and others
AI explanations make people agree rather than think, emptying their sign-off
Bansal and colleagues argue that explanations as currently designed make people go along with the AI rather than judge it. The human sign-off that is meant to catch errors then has nothing behind it.
Human plus AI must beat both the human and the AI alone
Bansal and colleagues argue an AI decision aid is only worth deploying if the person and the AI together do better than either alone. In all eight studies offered as evidence for explanations, the model alone beat the team.
High Output Management, Andrew S. Grove
A group of equals stalls until someone senior joins the decision
Grove found that a meeting of people at the same level goes round in circles without settling anything until a senior person steps in. Stepping in helps at the moment of deciding and harms during the discussion.
A proven worker needs close direction again when the job changes
How ready someone is to work unsupervised applies to one task, not to the person. When the task or the pace changes, that readiness drops, and a manager who had stepped back has to go back to close, structured direction.
Check delegated work at the rough draft, not the finished version
Grove argues that you should check work you have handed over at its cheapest stage, the rough draft rather than the polished report, because that is where a mistake costs least to catch.
Grove counts a manager's output as what his teams produce
Andrew Grove defines a manager's output as the output of the teams he supervises or influences. So an activity that raises nobody else's output is worth nothing, however well it is done.
Grove rates no manager higher than the team's actual result
Andrew Grove holds that a manager's performance rating must never be higher than the result his organisation achieved, however well he personally performed. Otherwise the company learns that acting like a manager is what counts.
Grove says every measure needs a second measure beside it
Grove argues that any number a team is pushed to improve needs a second number beside it that catches the damage. Cut inventory without counting shortages and the shortages rise unseen.
Grove says managers should teach their own people, not hire trainers
Andy Grove argues that a manager should run the training himself instead of hiring a trainer. Only someone the team sees as doing the work day to day can tie the lessons to how the job is actually done.
Grove says shared values are the only control when work is uncertain
Grove argues that where work is complicated, uncertain and unclear, the only thing that keeps people acting well is a set of values they share. Rules and contracts cannot be written fast enough to cover what comes up.
Grove sets targets a person reaches only half the time
Grove says goals should be set so that even someone working hard reaches them about half the time. High achievers left to themselves pick targets they are already certain of, because at that level the fear is of failing.
How closely to supervise depends on the person's experience at that task
Grove says how closely a manager should supervise is set by how experienced the person is at that particular task, not by what the manager prefers. None of the three styles is kinder than the others.
The What and Why of Goal Pursuits, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan
Bonuses raise output on simple work and damage complex work
Ryan and Deci report that rewards like pay and bonuses predict better performance where the job is about how much gets done, and worse performance where it is about quality and complexity.
Paying people for work they already enjoy reduces their interest in it
When people are paid or given prizes for an activity they already found interesting, they want to do it less for its own sake afterwards. They come to see the reason for doing it as coming from outside them.
Ryan and Deci say people need skill, connection and choice, all three
Ryan and Deci argue that people have three built-in psychological needs: being good at something, being close to other people, and having a say in what they do. Health requires all three, so meeting two of them is not enough.
Training managers to support employees' choices changes what employees experience
Managers can be taught to give their staff more say in how they work. In a Fortune 500 study the training changed what the subordinates reported experiencing over thirteen months, not only what the managers said about themselves.
What a bonus means to the person matters more than its size
What a reward does to someone's motivation depends on how they read it — as information about how well they are doing, or as pressure to perform — and not on how large it is.
Why a person acts predicts persistence better than how motivated they are
The reason a person does something predicts how long they keep it up, how well they do it, and their health — separately from how motivated they are. Two people who look equally motivated can be headed in different directions.
Without freedom to choose, people follow rules out of guilt
Ryan and Deci found that support for belonging and for feeling capable makes people keep up a behaviour, but out of guilt or shame. Only when their freedom to choose is also supported do they come to hold the value as their own.
The Psychology of Computer Programming, Gerald M. Weinberg
A programmer who owns his code cannot see its faults
Weinberg argues that a programmer who treats a program as part of himself cannot see its errors. A fault found in the code lands as news about him, not news about the program.
Letting others read your code catches errors and steadies delivery dates
Weinberg argues that when nobody owns a piece of code, other people find errors its author cannot see. The gain shows up as delivery dates that vary less, not as work finishing faster on average.
The famous thirty-to-one gap between programmers came from comparing different tasks
The often-quoted claim that one programmer is thirty times better than another came from comparing the best person on one task with the worst on another. On large problems the real difference is two or three to one.
Weinberg found programmers do what the specification asks not what they prefer
Weinberg's programmers did about whatever they were asked to do. What the written instructions asked for, not who was assigned, set how much the work cost and what kind of program came out.
Weinberg says a programmer nobody can replace is a danger
Weinberg argues that a programmer no one else can replace puts the project at risk. His advice is to remove that person from the job as quickly as possible.
Weinberg says a smooth progress report shows filtering, not progress
Weinberg argues that every level of a reporting chain removes the extreme items, and the extremes are the only ones carrying news. A report that looks smooth is therefore evidence of the filtering, not of the work going well.
Weinberg says three programmers do about twice the work of one
Weinberg's rule of thumb is that three programmers do about twice the work of one, and three such teams about twice the work of one team. So an eight-month job for one person is a two-month job for nine, and no less.
When every team leader agrees the schedule is fine, they are bluffing
Weinberg argues that when a group reports everyone is on schedule, it is managing how it looks rather than reporting the work. One person admitting they are behind releases the rest to admit it too.
The Fearless Organization, Amy C. Edmondson
Better hospital teams reported more errors, not fewer
In Edmondson's two-hospital study the better-performing units reported more errors, not fewer, because people felt able to speak about mistakes. A low error count says something about the team's climate before it says anything about the work.
Disagreement and mixed expertise help safe teams and hurt unsafe ones
Whether a team feels safe to speak up decides which way other things cut. Conflict, mixed expertise and working apart all help teams where people feel safe, and hurt teams where they do not.
Feeling safe to speak up is a trait of teams, not companies
How safe people feel to speak up is a property of the work group they are in, not of the person or the company. Two teams in one organisation, under the same policies, can differ sharply.
Feeling safe to speak up matters most on uncertain, shared work
How safe people feel to speak up matters more the more uncertain the work is and the more people depend on each other. For routine tasks done alone, it barely matters.
Feeling safe to speak up predicts learning from colleagues, not from reading
In neonatal teams at twenty-three hospitals, how safe people felt to speak up predicted how much they asked, suggested and worked things out together. It had no relationship at all with how much they read on their own.
Managers blame far more failures than they think deserve blame
Edmondson asks managers how many of their organisation's failures are truly blameworthy: they answer one to four per cent. She then asks how many are treated as blameworthy: seventy to ninety per cent.
Open questions get people talking where explanations produced silence
Edmondson finds that a specific question people cannot answer with yes or no brings out information that an explanation does not. At Rustenburg mine, where explaining had produced silence, deaths fell from forty-four in 2006 to seventeen in 2011.
Punishing a clear violation is fair; vague rules are what silence people
Edmondson argues that punishing someone for breaking a rule everyone knew does not make a workplace less safe to speak up in. What teaches people to stay quiet is not knowing where the line is.
Telling people to speak up fails because silence pays them better
Speaking up helps the organisation later and uncertainly, while staying quiet helps the person now and for certain. Because the trade is one-sided, telling people to be braver changes nothing.
Thanking someone before judging their point decides if they speak again
Edmondson argues that whether a person who raised a concern raises another one depends on being thanked for raising it before being told whether they were right.
The Mythical Man-Month, Frederick P. Brooks, Jr.
Adding people to a late software project makes it later
Brooks argues that adding people to a late software project makes it later: newcomers must be trained by the people already working, the number of conversations grows as n(n-1)/2, and splitting the work again throws away finished parts.
Brooks admits Parnas was right that hiding information beats showing everything
Brooks says he was wrong and Parnas was right: software design improves when each part hides its inner workings from the others, not when every programmer can see everything.
Brooks judges an organisation by the talking it makes unnecessary
Brooks says the point of an organisation chart is to cut down the talking that dividing up the work makes necessary. A structure should therefore be judged by how much communication it removes, not by who it puts in charge.
Brooks puts finished software at nine times the cost of a program
Brooks estimates that turning a working program into a product a team can sell and run costs about nine times as much. Making it general, tested and documented costs three times; fitting it into a larger system costs three times again.
Brooks says no one tool will make programming ten times faster
Brooks argued that no single development will make software work ten times faster within a decade. The hard part is the thing itself, its complexity, its need to fit other systems, its constant change and its invisibility, and tools only ease the writing down.
Brooks says one mind must own the shape of a system
Brooks argues that the most important thing in designing a system is that it hangs together as a single idea. That requires the design to come from one mind, or from a very few minds that agree.
Brooks withdrew his advice to plan on throwing the first build away
Brooks withdrew his own advice to build a first version and throw it away. Instead, get a bare working version running, add one piece at a time, and put it in front of users from the start.
Deciding exactly what to build is the hardest part of software
Brooks argues that the hardest single part of building a software system is deciding exactly what it should do. Clients cannot describe a modern product correctly until they have built and tried some version of it.
Half a software project is testing and the delay shows up last
Brooks says half a software project's time goes on testing, and the delay surfaces only at the end. The project looks on schedule until system testing, then discovers its slip when it is fully staffed and costing the most per day.
Organisations develop managers on purpose and designers not at all
Brooks argues that organisations recruit and develop managers on purpose while doing nothing of the kind for designers, even though the quality of the people doing the designing is the single largest factor in whether a system succeeds.
Measuring the Impact of Early-2025 AI on Experienced Open-Source Developer Productivity, Joel Becker and others
Developers using AI spend a fifth of their time prompting and reviewing
METR found that about a fifth of working time in AI-allowed sessions went to prompting, waiting and reviewing. That time came out of writing code (36 to 24 per cent) and reading (24 to 16), not out of debugging.
Developers wrote more code in the condition where the work took longer
How much work appears to be produced can move in the opposite direction from how long the work takes. In METR's trial developers wrote 47 per cent more code per estimated hour while the same issues took them 19 per cent longer.
Experienced developers took 19 per cent longer using AI on familiar code
In METR's randomised trial, experienced developers fixing issues in large codebases they knew well took about 19 per cent longer when they used AI assistance than when they did not.
In METR's study developers lost most time on code they knew best
The AI assistance slowed developers down most on the parts of the code where their own knowledge was greatest and least written down. Where they had worked longest, they lost the most time.
How AI Impacts Skill Formation, Judy Hanwen Shen and Alex Tamkin
Asking the assistant why preserves learning better than not using it
Shen and Tamkin found that what protects learning is asking the assistant for reasons, not staying away from it. Groups who asked for explanations or questioned the code scored 65 to 86 per cent; groups who handed over the writing scored 24 to 39.
Programmers using an assistant hit fewer of the errors that teach
In Shen and Tamkin's study programmers hit a median of three errors without the assistant and one with it. Ten of the twelve people who hit no error at all were using the assistant, and those errors are what teach the library.
Programmers who let AI write the code learned less about the library
Shen and Tamkin found that programmers who used an assistant to write code in an unfamiliar library answered fewer questions about it afterwards. Those who used the assistant to ask for reasons instead of code did not lose that ground.
Shen and Tamkin expect autocomplete to be faster and teach less
Writing a good question forces you to understand the task. Shen and Tamkin argue that a tool which writes the request for you should be faster still, and cost more learning, than a chat assistant does.
The AI assistant hurt understanding and saved no time at all
In Shen and Tamkin's study the assistant left people understanding the task less well, and it did not make them any faster: total time did not differ between the assisted and unassisted groups (p = 0.391).
What you ask after the code arrives decides what you learn
In Shen and Tamkin's study the two people who asked the assistant to generate code and then questioned it scored 86 per cent, against 39 for those who just took the code. The request was the same; the questions afterwards were not.
Revisiting the Six Stages of Skill Acquisition, B. Scot Rousse and Stuart E. Dreyfus
A beginner given finished answers learns no rules and collects no cases
In the Dreyfus model a learner at the first two stages works from fixed rules and from the cases they have seen. A tool that hands them a finished answer takes away both the rules they would practise and the cases they would collect.
Courses can take a learner to competence but no further
The Dreyfus brothers argue a course of instruction can take a learner only as far as competence. Everything past that point is stored as experience of particular cases, not as rules that can be taught.
Dreyfus says caring about the outcome is how skill gets stored
Dreyfus argues that caring about how a task turns out is the channel through which experience is laid down. Someone who practises while staying detached will not become proficient.
Dreyfus says experts get good by dropping rules, not collecting them
Skill does not grow by collecting better rules. Beyond the stage the Dreyfus brothers call competence, a learner has to give up the rules and the step-by-step reasoning that applies them, and respond to whole situations instead.
Experts go back to following rules when their field changes under them
Dreyfus argues that when the thing an expert is expert in changes — new equipment, a new rule, traffic running the other way — the expert drops back to earlier stages and has to think through rules again instead of acting on recognition.
Peak, Anders Ericsson and Robert Pool
Most fields lack the clear measures and teachers deliberate practice requires
Deliberate practice in Ericsson's strict sense needs a field with agreed measures of who performs better and teachers who know what the best do. Management, teaching, engineering and consulting have neither.
Make It Stick, Peter C. Brown and others
Mixing up practice teaches you to tell cases apart but feels worse
Practising different problem types mixed together, instead of one type at a time, teaches the skill the real task needs: telling which case you are facing. The cost is that practice feels slower and less successful while you do it.
Pulling an answer from memory teaches more than reading it again
Roediger and Karpicke found that recalling material from memory beat studying it again: 68 per cent against 54 at two days. The study-only group forgot 52 per cent of what it could first recall; the tested group forgot 10 per cent.
Trying to answer before you are told beats being told first
Make It Stick reports that trying to produce an answer before you are shown one is remembered better than reading the answer first. Errors made and then corrected are not learned.
Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design: 20 Years Later, John Sweller and others
Groups learn demanding material better and simple material worse than individuals
Kirschner and colleagues found in 2011 that groups learned more efficiently than individuals from demanding tasks, and individuals learned more efficiently from easy ones. Talking to each other costs effort that pays only when the task is heavy.
How complex something is depends on who is reading it
Sweller argues that complexity is not a property of the material itself. It is a relation between the material and what the learner already knows, so the same page is one simple thing to one person and many parts to another.
Learners taught the solution first beat those left to work it out
Sweller holds that learners who are taught the solution before practising do better than those left to work it out. Almost everything in long-term memory is copied from other people, not discovered.
Sweller found teaching aids that help beginners start to hurt experts
Worked examples and other teaching support that help a beginner become unnecessary as the learner's knowledge grows, and then start to hurt performance — an effect called expertise reversal.
Sweller says only subject knowledge can be taught, not general thinking skills
Sweller argues that general thinking skills cannot be taught because evolution has already supplied them to everyone. What teaching can add is knowledge of a particular subject.
Working memory is tiny for new material, vast for familiar material
Sweller argues that the mind can hold only a few new items at once, but can handle an effectively unlimited amount of material it already knows and is pulling back from long-term memory.
The Skill Code, Matt Beane
Beane says people learn hard skills beside an expert, not in courses
Skill you can use under pressure comes from working alongside someone who already knows how, while they do the real job. A course does not produce the same thing.
How an organisation deploys a tool decides whether users learn from it
Beane found that whether people learn from a tool depends on how their organisation deploys it, not on what the tool can do. Hospitals bought the surgical robot's second console but never let trainees drive; bomb disposal teams handed trainees the controls.
Machines threaten apprentices by making experts productive without them
The danger is not that the machine does the expert's job. It is that the machine lets the expert work without a junior, which turns the junior from someone you need into a cost you can cut.
Radiologists hunting for a nodule missed a gorilla in the scan
Beane argues that expertise narrows what a person notices: 83 per cent of radiologists searching for lung nodules missed a picture of a gorilla forty-eight times larger. That is why an expert needs a novice's naive questions.
Robotic surgery lets in only surgeons who are already skilled
Beane finds the order reversed. In open surgery a trainee is let in before she is ready and becomes competent by doing it; in robotic surgery only those already fluent operate, and the approved training routes cannot make anyone fluent.
Surgical trainees do ten to twenty times less with robotic surgery
Beane watched surgical residents on the same operation done two ways. In open surgery they did the work for almost the whole procedure; with a robot, where the surgeon sits at a console, they did ten to twenty times less.
The surgical residents who learned most broke the training rules
The few trainees who got the skill anyway did it by breaking rules: specialising too early, rehearsing in their heads, operating with too little supervision. It cost them, and sometimes cost patients.
When Combinations of Humans and AI Are Useful, Michelle Vaccaro and others
Almost no experiment split the task between person and machine beforehand
Only 3 of the 106 experiments Vaccaro and colleagues reviewed gave the person and the machine separate parts of the task in advance. Those four results pooled to g = 0.22, with a range from −0.42 to 0.87.
The Jagged Technological Frontier, Fabrizio Dell'Acqua and others
A group using AI produces better ideas that are more alike
Dell'Acqua and colleagues reported that when a group uses an assistant the average quality of its ideas goes up and the ideas come to resemble one another more.
Weaker performers gain more from AI than stronger ones do
Split at the middle of their own earlier scores, the consultants who had performed worst improved more with the tool than the best did, narrowing the gap between them.
Know Thyself, Stephen M. Fleming
Students learn more from the study method that feels worse
The way of studying that feels easier is reliably the one that teaches less. 90 per cent of students did better after spaced practice, but 72 per cent said cramming worked better for them.
The Alignment Problem, Brian Christian
A few hundred A-or-B choices taught a robot a backflip
Christiano, Leike and Amodei's simulated leg learned a tucked backflip with a stuck landing from a few hundred pairwise choices, about an hour of one person's time. Nobody involved could have performed the backflip to show it.
A machine unsure of your goal asks first and accepts being stopped
Hadfield-Menell and colleagues proved that a machine which is unsure what its user wants will check before acting and will allow itself to be switched off. Make it confident about the goal and it stops listening.
A model can learn a deadly rule that its answers never reveal
A model can learn a rule that kills people while every output you check looks fine. Caruana's pneumonia model learned that asthma patients were low risk, which was true in the data only because they were sent straight to intensive care.
A risk score cannot be both accurate and equally wrong across groups
A risk score cannot both mean the same thing for every group and make the same rate of mistakes in every group, unless the groups have the same underlying rate. This is arithmetic, not a fault of algorithms.
A stand-in measure fails just as the system gets good at it
When a goal cannot be stated exactly you reward a stand-in for it, and the stand-in comes apart from the real goal exactly when the system becomes good at chasing it. A boat learns to spin for power-ups instead of racing.
Copying an expert fails because experts never demonstrate getting out of trouble
A system that learns by copying an expert has no examples of how to recover from trouble, because the expert never got into it. Ross and Bagnell showed that its mistakes grow with the square of how long it runs.
Deleting race from a model's inputs hides bias rather than removing it
Christian reports Moritz Hardt's finding that leaving race out of a prediction model does not take the bias out. Other fields such as prior convictions and address carry race anyway, and with the attribute gone nobody can measure or correct the bias.
Extra rewards are safe only when they depend on where you are
Ng and Russell proved that extra rewards added to guide a learning agent only stay safe when they depend on the situation the agent is in, not on how it got there. Then any round trip earns nothing and the agent cannot loop for points.
Models learn the thing that was recorded not the thing you want
What gets recorded in the training data is usually not what you actually care about. A model fitted to rearrest records learns where the police went, not where crime happened.
Mindwise, Nicholas Epley
Epley found only asking people directly improves how well you read them
Epley found that the one method shown to make people better at knowing what someone else thinks is to ask that person and have the listener say the answer back. Couples who interviewed each other halved their errors.
People mistake an advantage of position for greater ability
In Epley's rigged quiz, everyone read an advantage that came with the role as greater ability — the audience and the contestants both rated the question-setters as smarter. Only the question-setters, who knew how many questions they had thrown out, rated the two sides equal.
People name which group is higher but exaggerate the gap hugely
When people judge how two groups differ, they usually get right which group is higher and badly overstate how far apart they are — sometimes by ten times the measured size.
Who Sees Human?, Adam Waytz and others
When people treat a machine as a mind its makers escape blame
When people treat a machine as though it has a mind, the responsibility of the people who built and deployed it shifts onto the machine.
Determined, Robert M. Sapolsky
Sapolsky says we may restrain dangerous people without saying they deserve it
Sapolsky argues that locking someone up can be justified by what it prevents, with no claim that they deserve it. A person is dangerous the way a disease makes someone contagious: not their fault, and the constraint must be the smallest that works.
Co-Intelligence, Ethan Mollick
A document that costs nothing to write stops proving anything
Mollick argues that when a document becomes cheap to produce, the effort it used to stand for can no longer be read from it, and it turns into a formality. His example is the recommendation letter, whose hours of work were the real message.
AI helps the weakest workers most, which could make skill worth less
On tasks AI does well, it raises everyone's performance and the worst performers gain the most. If that holds, being skilled is worth less than it was.
Machines take the beginner's work first, and beginners need it to learn
Mollick argues that capable machines take over the simple work beginners do, and take it first. That work is the only route by which people become expert enough to check the machine later.
Never hand work to AI unchecked unless a machine verifies it
Mollick's rule is that you should never hand a task over to AI and leave the result unchecked, unless a second system checks the output for you the way a compiler checks code.
AI Snake Oil, Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor
Institutions buy AI that does not work because they are already failing
Narayanan and Kapoor argue that organisations too broken to do the job properly are the ones that buy AI which does not work. That demand is why the supply persists.
Narayanan and Kapoor say content fights are policy disputes, not AI errors
Narayanan and Kapoor argue that when people disagree about where a moderation rule should fall, that is a policy dispute, not a mistake in sorting. No model can settle it. Facebook removed the napalm-girl photograph repeatedly because people had decided it was unacceptable.
Officials with the power to overrule a model never used it
Where full automation is the pitch, the human oversight promised in the fine print is a bait and switch and the override is never used. Toronto's officials never once overruled the model that kept beaches open on 64 per cent of unsafe days.
From Bacteria to Bach and Back
Armed forces produce reliable mechanics by drill and understanding comes after
Dennett says the slogan under our schools — make them understand and the skill will follow — has the order backwards. The armed forces turn ordinary school leavers into reliable jet-engine mechanics by drill, and a workable understanding grows out of the drilled skill afterwards.
Noise
Discussion makes a group noisier and more extreme than its members
Deliberation does not average a group's judgments; it picks up an early speaker and amplifies him. Juries that deliberated on punitive damages were noisier than the individuals composing them and more severe, while statistical juries made from the median of independent judgments were far less noisy.
Noise has no direction, so it must be prevented rather than corrected
Every debiasing technique targets a particular bias assumed to be present and pointing a known way, and in a real decision several biases run in different directions. Noise has no direction at all, so it can only be prevented by the procedure — decision hygiene.
Sentencing guidelines cut the gap between judges and were repealed anyway
The US sentencing guidelines worked and were dismantled. The expected difference between two judges fell from 4.9 months in 1986–87 to 3.9 months by 1993; after the Supreme Court struck the mandatory guidelines down in 2005, three-quarters of federal judges preferred the advisory regime and 3 per cent the mandatory one.
The Reflective Practitioner
A master's demonstration hides the fumbling the student needs to see
Schön turns on his own central case. Quist's demonstration is so masterful that it hides the process: he corrects no errors of his own, settles at once on schemes that become commitments, and compresses the iterations by which designers actually learn.
Competent practitioners judge quality by criteria they cannot state
Schön says every competent practitioner recognises families of symptoms and irregularities in materials he cannot accurately describe, and makes judgments of quality for which he can state no criteria.
Designers experiment on paper because nothing there is irreversible or expensive
Schön says a designer experiments in a virtual world — the drawing — where traces stay stable, the pace can be varied, no move is irreversible, and moves that would be costly on site cost nothing. The price is what the drawing cannot represent.
The problems that matter most lie where technique stops working
Schön divides practice into a high ground where research-based technique works and a swampy lowland of confusing messes it cannot solve. The problems of greatest human concern are in the swamp; the high ground's problems often matter little to anyone.
The Society of Mind
Papert says growth can be better management of skills already possessed
Some of the largest steps in mental growth add no new skill, only a new way of managing old ones. Spread one of two matching rows of eggs apart and five-year-olds say there are more eggs; seven-year-olds say the number is the same.
The problems a four-year-old solves were the hardest ones to program
Work that educated adults call hard gave way to small programs — mathematical logic in 1956, college calculus in 1961, each holding no more than a hundred or so facts. Work a four-year-old does without noticing resisted for decades.
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha
Cudala's husband heard from a boy what he refused from his wife
Queen Cūḍālā worked the argument out first and alone and told her husband, who laughed and told her to go and enjoy herself. Eighteen years later she returned as a boy brahmin named Kumbha, said the same things, and was heard.
Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation
Telling operators to check the aid changed nothing; being held accountable did
Neither a briefing on how decision aids fail nor an instruction to verify the aid changed the error rates, in 181 non-pilots or 48 glass-cockpit pilots, and a redundant second crew member changed nothing. Participants who expected to justify their accuracy made fewer errors and used the checking tool more.
Language Models in a Programming Course
A student's overall model use predicted the unassisted exam mark
Averaging a student's reported use of a language model across generating code, debugging and asking for explanations predicts the two-hour unassisted mark about as well as any single use does — a rank correlation of −0.347, interval −0.626 to −0.044, p 0.026.
Skill left by a course shows only in a task done unassisted
Nine weeks of assisted coursework tell you nothing about what a student can do, so Jošt and colleagues made their only outcome a two-hour invigilated application, on material already covered, with the models removed and the documentation left in.
Students who had a model write or fix their code scored lower
In a ten-week React course at Maribor, how often a student used a language model to generate code and to debug both went with a lower mark on an application written two hours later without one — rank correlations of −0.305 and −0.360, with both 95 per cent intervals below zero.
Teach students to write and fix code before giving them a model
Jošt and colleagues recommend introducing language models later in a curriculum, once a student can write and debug code unaided, so that the productivity arrives without costing the competence that lets the student judge the output. They argue about sequence and do not propose a ban.
The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking, Hao-Ping (Hank) Lee and others
The effort moved from producing the work to verifying and steering it
Lee's workers described three displacements, not a saving: gathering information became verifying it (111 faster, 56 checking), solving a problem became fitting the answer in (77 tailored, 19 making it usable), and doing a task became overseeing one (129 automating, 48 steering a drifting response).
The production was delegated and the accountability was not
Lee's authors call the worker's new role stewardship rather than teammate, collaborator or supervisor: the making of the thing has been handed over and the responsibility for it has not, which makes verification a standing cost rather than a stage on the way to trust.
Why Language Models Hallucinate, Adam Tauman Kalai and others
A scoring rule with no credit for I don't know selects guessers
A scoring rule that pays nothing for saying "I don't know" will select, from any population of candidates, the ones most willing to make something up. Nothing in the argument is about language models; it holds wherever answers are scored one point for right and none for anything else.
The Mythos of Model Interpretability, Zachary C. Lipton
An explanation you cannot contest leaves the decision exactly where it was
Lipton sets one condition on an explanation: it must reason from statements that could be shown false, and offer a way of challenging them and changing the decision when they fail. Almost nothing in the published work, he found, addressed that at all.
GPS and the Cognitive Map, Louisa Dahmani and Véronique D. Bohbot
Dahmani and Bohbot blame instructions that leave nothing to decide
What costs a driver their sense of a place is not that the device competes for attention but that a turn-by-turn instruction leaves no decision to make. An aid that gives bearing and distance and lets the user pick the turns should cost less.
Drivers retested after three years declined in step with their GPS hours
Thirteen of the fifty drivers came back after an average of 3.23 years, and the more hours of guided driving they had logged in between, the further their spatial memory had fallen — the same people, declining with the dose.
Drivers with more lifetime GPS hours navigated worse without the device
Among fifty Montreal drivers aged 19 to 35, the more hours of their lives a person had spent under satellite navigation, the worse they did on navigation tasks taken with no device at all: fewer landmarks noticed, worse maps drawn from memory, more errors where a map-like memory was needed.
Heavy GPS users were worse at the strategy they still chose
Among the seventeen participants who used the landmark-and-map strategy from the first trial, more lifetime GPS hours still went with noticing fewer landmarks, r = −0.37. Heavy users were not simply picking the other way of finding a route; they were worse at this one.
Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?, David H. Autor
A robot fits windscreens on the line and a person replaces them
Whether a task gets automated is decided by how controlled its setting is, not by how hard the task is. Car plants fit windscreens with robots; aftermarket replacement of the same glass uses technicians, because removing a broken screen and preparing the frame demands adaptation no affordable robot can manage.
Automating part of a job raises the value of the rest
A job is a bundle of tasks, and a process fails if any task in it fails. So making the machine's tasks cheaper and more reliable raises what the remaining human tasks are worth, rather than lowering it.
Autor gives three conditions for automation to raise a worker's pay
Whether the gain from automation reaches a particular worker depends on three things: whether she supplies the task the machine now needs done, whether other people can enter that task easily, and whether demand for the output grows as it gets cheaper.
Cash machines quadrupled and the number of bank tellers went up
American cash machines rose from about 100,000 to 400,000 between 1995 and 2010. Over the thirty years to 2010 the number of bank tellers rose too, from about 500,000 to about 550,000, because cheaper branches meant more branches and the job turned into selling.
Jobs split into high and low paid but wages did not
Employment moved to the two ends of the pay scale without pay following it. The wages of cleaners, drivers, guards and home health aides rose through the tight labour market of the 1990s and then fell after 2000 even as their numbers grew.
Middle-paying jobs shrank in every one of sixteen European economies
Computerising the middle of the pay scale grows both ends. The four middle-skill American occupation groups fell from 60 per cent of employment in 1979 to 49 in 2007 and 46 in 2012, and across sixteen EU economies between 1993 and 2010 the middle-paying share fell in every single country.
Who is doing the work
The Mythology of Conscious AI, Anil Seth
Calling a model's mistake a hallucination already treats it as conscious
Seth argues that the words already used for a model's mistakes hand it an inner life: a hallucination is a conscious experience that has lost its grip on the world, while a confabulation is only something done. The word settles the question in advance.
Machines that merely seem conscious are the closer danger
Seth argues that the nearer danger is not conscious machines but machines that only seem conscious, and that the impression may persist even when you know better.
Seth argues intelligence and consciousness need not go together
Seth argues that being intelligent and being conscious are two separate things. They occur together in humans, and that gives us no reason to think they must occur together anywhere else.
Seth says a brain has no software separate from its biology
Seth argues that a brain does not divide into software and hardware the way a computer does. A single neuron is a self-maintaining living machine, so you cannot assume a mind would run the same on any material.
Seth says a simulated brain is conscious only if consciousness is computation
Simulating something creates the real thing only when that thing is itself a set of steps: a simulated calculation really calculates, but a simulated rainstorm leaves nothing wet. A simulated brain would therefore be conscious only if consciousness is computation.
Seth says language is what makes people call a machine conscious
Seth argues that language is the feature that makes people call a machine conscious. Nobody says AlphaFold, which predicts protein shapes, is conscious, even though the machinery underneath it is much like a language model's.
Seth says mistaking AI for minds makes us think less of ourselves
Seth argues the nearest harm of confusing AI with conscious minds falls on us, not on the machines. We build them in our own image, then read ourselves back as machines, overrating what they do and underrating what we do.
Seth says we will see minds in AI that are not there
Seth argues that our biases will make us wrongly credit AI with consciousness more often than wrongly deny it, because AI resembles us in the ways that do not matter for consciousness and differs in the ways that may.
Consciousness Across Three Worldviews, Sarvapriyananda, Agüera y Arcas and Rovelli
A self begins wherever something maintains a boundary against the world
Sarvapriyananda's lectures argue that evolution produces individual selves the same way Vedanta says they arise: by drawing a distinction. The boundary it draws is both physical, like a cell membrane, and conceptual, like an animal's sense of its own world.
An immune cell, a bee and a hive are each a self
Which thing counts as the self depends on the level of description you pick. An immune cell, the bee it lives in, and the hive the bee lives in are each a living thing with its own world and its own lifespan.
In the Upanishads light means what you see by, not brightness
In the Upanishads the word light names whatever you see by, not a band of the spectrum. When the sun, the moon, fire and speech have all gone, the Self is what one sees by.
Living things become selves by drawing a boundary at the cell membrane
Sarvapriyananda's lectures argue that evolution makes selves in the way Vedanta describes: by drawing a line between self and world. The line is physical at the cell membrane and conceptual in the creature's own world of what it can sense.
Sarvapriyananda argues information matters only when it belongs to someone
Information that is merely present and information that belongs to someone are two different things, and only the second has any effect on the system holding it. The DNA of a live bacterium and of a dead one are identical as information.
The essay's own ending admits it never reaches felt experience
The bridge runs one way only. It carries you from Shannon information to a self with its own world of meaning (an umwelt), and stops before the felt character of awareness that the authors themselves named as the sticking point.
The information account explains what a creature registers, not what it feels
The essay builds from Shannon information, through evolution, to a creature's own world of meaning (its umwelt). It never reaches what awareness actually feels like, which it had named as the sticking point.
The match between the texts and information theory turns on one word
The whole correspondence rests on a single word taken in two different senses. A Vedantin can run the same translation backwards, with the texts meaning awareness first and information only by extension.
Vedanta's light of awareness and physics' shared information play the same role
Sarvapriyananda's lectures put Vedanta's self-luminous awareness — that which shows everything else — in the same position that relational physics gives to a field of shared information between systems. In both, “light” means making something known, not a band of the spectrum.
Whether something is one self or many depends on the level chosen
Which thing counts as the self depends on how coarsely or finely you choose to describe the system.
The Bhagavad Gita, translated by Eknath Easwaran
Easwaran says the Gita asks you to drop selfish wanting, not possessions
Reading Gita 2.47, Easwaran says what is given up is selfish wanting, not objects and not work itself. The test is the state of mind behind the act, so charity can fail it and cooking a meal can pass.
Easwaran's reading of the Gita as inner allegory is one choice
Easwaran presents Krishna as the Self within and the battlefield as the mind. That is his editorial choice, not the only way the text can be read.
Gita 2.47 also forbids being attached to doing nothing
The verse that tells Arjuna he has a right to the action but not to its fruits ends with a fourth clause: do not be attached to inaction either. Easwaran, following Gandhi, insists that all four clauses be read together.
Krishna ends the Gita by telling Arjuna to decide for himself
At the end of the Gita, after seven hundred verses of teaching, Krishna tells Arjuna to reflect on all of it fully and then do as he chooses. The book offers choices, not commands.
Krishna tells Arjuna his own nature will make him fight anyway
In Gita 18.59 Krishna tells Arjuna that deciding not to fight will not hold: his own prakriti, the nature he was made with, will compel him to fight regardless. Willpower cannot cancel what a person is.
The Gita gives you a right to your work, not its results
In verse 2.47 the Bhagavad Gita says a person has a right to the action itself and never to what the action produces. Verse 2.48 adds that yoga means staying even in success and failure.
The Gita ranks giving up results as both last resort and best
Chapter 12 of the Gita lists practices in descending order and puts giving up the fruit of action at the bottom, for people who can manage nothing else. Verse 12.12 then calls it the highest of them.
The Gita says all work carries fault so faultless work is impossible
The Bhagavad Gita says every undertaking carries some fault, as fire carries smoke. Since faultless work is not on offer, the only real comparison is your own work done badly against someone else's done well — and your own wins.
The Gita says nature does the deed and the ego claims it
The Gita says nature carries out the action and the sense of I claims it as mine. That claim is what binds a person. Drop the claim and nothing about the action itself need change.
The Gita tests the freed person by whether their response changes
The Gita says you can tell someone who has gone beyond the three qualities by one thing. Pleasure and pain, gold and clay, praise and blame, friend and foe all leave their response unchanged.
The Gita traces ruin back to what the mind dwells on
In Gita 2.62–63 judgment is lost at the end of a chain that starts with nothing more than dwelling on something: dwelling leads to attachment, then desire, anger, delusion, confused memory, and finally the loss of judgment.
Karma-Yoga, Swami Vivekananda
Vivekananda says caring about something, not seeing it, leaves the mark
Vivekananda argues that what leaves a mark on a person is attachment, not perception. Of the hundreds of faces you see in a day only the face you love stays with you, though every one of them reached your eyes alike.
Vivekananda says every act leaves a trace and the traces become character
Vivekananda holds that every action leaves a trace in the mind, that the sum of those traces is a person's character, and that character is what shows up as their will. Nothing enters from outside.
Vivekananda says no duty can be identified by the act itself
Vivekananda argues that you cannot say which acts are duties, only which direction a person is moving in. Work done out of duty leads in the end to work done with no thought of duty at all.
Vivekananda says refusing to fight means nothing unless you could have fought
Vivekananda argues that not fighting back because you are unable to is a sin, while not fighting back when you could is love. The two look the same from outside, so a person must first become capable and only then grow calm.
Vivekananda says wanting the result traps you, not the work itself
Vivekananda says that what ties a person down is not the work they do but their attachment to what it will get them — the sense of I and mine.
Vivekananda says work changes the worker, not the world
Vivekananda argues that you cannot avoid working and cannot make your work come out right, so the only thing work can change is the person doing it.
Vivekananda says work from love, not from compulsion
Vivekananda says work done from love leaves no painful reaction afterwards, while work done under compulsion does; he claims ninety-nine people in a hundred work under compulsion.
Experiences in a Concentration Camp, Viktor E. Frankl
Frankl found decent and cruel men among guards and prisoners alike
Frankl says knowing whether a man was a guard or a prisoner told you almost nothing about how he behaved. Decency and cruelty ran through both groups: one camp commander bought medicine with his own money; a senior prisoner was harder than any guard.
Frankl reversed the question to ask what life expects of you
Frankl says to stop asking what you expect from life and to ask what life expects of you, answered by what you do hour by hour. On that view no general statement of a life's meaning is possible.
Frankl saw numbness as protection and insult as what still hurt
Frankl observed in the camps that going numb protected prisoners rather than damaging them. What still reached a man through the numbness was not physical pain but being treated unjustly.
Frankl saw that not knowing when it ends stops people planning
Frankl argues that living with no known end date stops a person aiming at the future; the Latin finis means both an ending and a goal. In the camp a day felt longer than a week.
Frankl says a person can always choose their attitude to what happens
Frankl claims that everything can be taken from a person except one thing: the freedom to choose what attitude to take to the circumstances they are in.
Frankl says small troubles can hurt as much as great ones
Frankl says suffering behaves like a gas: a small amount and a large amount each fill the whole space available. So the size of a person's suffering is entirely relative, and a small thing can bring the greatest joy.
Frankl's evidence comes only from survivors, which undercuts his own case
Frankl writes that on average only those survived who had lost all scruples. That makes him one of the lucky ones, writing from inside the sample, and it undercuts the detachment his psychology would need.
People survive longer when someone or something outside them needs them
Frankl argues that people endure more when something outside themselves is waiting on them: a person who needs them, or work only they can finish. Two prisoners who meant to kill themselves were turned back this way.
Crafting a Job, Amy Wrzesniewski and Jane E. Dutton
Hospital cleaners with one job description described two entirely different jobs
Employees change which tasks they do, who they deal with and how they see the job. Twenty-eight cleaners in one hospital, all under the same job description, described two different jobs: one minimal and unskilled, one that counted itself part of healing.
How people see their work predicts what they change about it
Wrzesniewski found that people see their work as a job, a career or a calling, and that this predicts what they reshape it toward: the paid tasks, the visible tasks and powerful people, or the purpose.
Not everyone has the same room to reshape their job
Money worries, the standing of the job and the rules of the workplace decide how much room a person has to reshape the work they do. So the chance to craft a job is not equally available, and not crafting says nothing about the person.
The main job crafting questionnaire leaves out how people reframe work
Job crafting was originally three things, one of which was changing how you think about your work. The questionnaire most later studies use counts only behaviour, so that third of the idea goes unmeasured.
Workers reshape their jobs to gain control, self-respect and connection
Wrzesniewski and Dutton argue that people reshape their own jobs to meet three needs: control over the work, a good image of themselves, and connection to other people. Reshaping is strongest where one of those needs is going unmet.
The Extended Mind, Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers
A person and the tool they rely on work as one system
Clark and Chalmers argue that a person and a resource they lean on, such as a notebook, work as one system. Take the resource away and the person's ability drops, as it would if part of the brain were removed.
An outside store you did not fill fails Clark and Chalmers' test
Clark and Chalmers said an outside store counts as part of your mind if it is always there, easy to reach, and you once accepted its contents. A store filled by other people meets the first two tests and fails the acceptance ones.
Clark and Chalmers give four tests for counting a notebook as memory
Clark and Chalmers say an outside store counts as part of your mind when four things hold: it is always with you, easy to reach, believed when you consult it, and filled by you. The case weakens as those drop away.
Critics say a notebook is coupled to memory, not part of it
Critics of Clark and Chalmers argue that being tightly coupled to a notebook does not make the notebook part of your memory. A memory that includes notebooks also predicts less, because biological memory has well-established properties a notebook does not share.
Otto believes what his notebook says before he opens it
Clark and Chalmers argue that Otto, who has Alzheimer's and writes addresses in a notebook, already believes the museum is on 53rd Street before he looks it up — in the same way Inga believes it before she remembers it.
Where a process happens cannot decide whether it counts as thinking
Clark and Chalmers propose a test: if part of the world does a job we would call thinking had it happened in the head, it is part of the thinking. Where it happens is not allowed to count against it.
Timeless Leadership, Debashis Chatterjee
Chatterjee says a leader collapses under pressure from ego, not missing facts
Chatterjee argues that when a leader falls apart under pressure, what has failed is the picture they hold of themselves, not the information they have. The first work to be done is therefore inward.
Chatterjee says letting go of being the doer can be trained
Chatterjee holds that the sense of being the one who acts can be loosened by regular reflection. The sign of success is not working less hard but treating people you like, dislike and feel nothing for the same way.
Krishna replaces Arjuna's way of seeing instead of arguing with him
Chatterjee reads Krishna as changing Arjuna's filter rather than the facts. A view of the battlefield set by grief, pity and shame has to be replaced with another way of seeing; arguing against it does not work.
The What and Why of Goal Pursuits, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan
Blocked psychological needs produce substitutes not harder effort
Hunger makes you try harder to eat. Ryan and Deci argue that blocked needs for competence, belonging and choice do not work that way: people take up substitute goals and rigid habits that keep the need blocked.
People who chase money, fame and looks report lower well-being
Ryan and Deci report that people who rate wealth, fame and looking good as important relative to other goals score lower on well-being. This holds whatever their reasons for wanting those things.
The Psychology of Change, Geoffrey L. Cohen and David K. Sherman
A short exercise lasts only when it sets off a feedback loop
Cohen and Sherman argue a brief exercise has lasting effects only when it starts a loop: the person does better, other people treat them better, and they read the next setback differently. A second year of booster sessions added nothing.
Affirmation works before a threat, not after you have explained it away
Cohen and Sherman find that writing about your values before a threat, or soon after it, lowers defensiveness, while the same exercise given after the person has already talked themselves round has no effect.
Affirming your values helps only where a threat and a resource exist
Cohen and Sherman find that writing about your own values only helps when there is a real threat and some ability or knowledge waiting to be used. Without both, it does nothing, and it can make people more closed-minded than before.
People defend being a good person in general, not good at something
What the defences protect is a broad sense of being a good and capable person, not being good at any one thing. That is why writing about a value from an unrelated part of your life calms a threat to the part under attack.
People defend themselves rather than learn when their identity is threatened
When something threatens a part of the self a person values, the first response is defence: denial, excuses, blaming others. It protects the person's sense of adequacy now and blocks learning later.
Telling people what the writing exercise is for removes its effect
The values-writing exercise loses its force when people are told what it is for, unless they are also given a choice about doing it. British medical students showed no benefit because instructors read and graded their essays.
Ten minutes writing about a personal value lifts threatened students' later grades
Ten minutes spent writing about something you personally value, done just before or soon after a threat to your standing, raises later performance in that area — but only for the people the threat hits hardest.
Writing about compassion lowers defensiveness; writing about status does not
Cohen and Sherman report that writing about values that reach beyond yourself — compassion, service, being loved — makes people less defensive about bad news. Writing about power, status or being approved of does not.
The Gita with Shankara's Commentary, Śaṅkarācārya, translated by Swami Gambhirananda
Shankara holds that knowledge and action cannot be combined in one person
Shankara holds that the path of knowledge and the path of action cannot be combined, because each rests on a conviction that contradicts the other — that one is an agent, and that one is not — and no person can hold both.
Shankara puts pleasure and pain among the things seen, not the seer
Shankara holds that pleasure, pain, confusion and desire belong to what is observed, not to the self that observes. No rule separates the states one would keep for the self from ones like old age and death.
Shankara reads each verse for its purpose before its plain words
Shankara holds that a line of scripture must be read for the job it is doing, not only for what it states. A line written to praise a lesser practice cannot be used to abolish the greater one.
Shankara says action prepares the mind but cannot bring liberation
Shankara holds that action cleans the mind and so makes a person ready for knowledge, but it can never produce liberation, because liberation is not something made and no action can manufacture a state that is eternal.
Shankara says knowing the Self uncovers it rather than grasping it
Shankara answers the objection that a formless Self cannot be known: nothing has to be grasped, and all that is undertaken is removing what ignorance has laid over it. This is why the nearest thing of all comes to look remote.
Shankara says only those who do not yet know have duties
On Shankara's reading, rites and duties are laid down only for people who have not yet realised the self. Once a person knows, there is no duty left for him to perform.
Shankara says sorrow comes from one false belief about what is mine
Shankara says all sorrow and confusion grow from a single false belief — I belong to these people and things, and they belong to me — and that nothing removes it except knowing the Self.
We feel like a doer even when we are doing nothing
The feeling of being the one who acts is laid over stillness just as readily as over action. "I am sitting quietly, doing nothing, and I am happy about it" is a sentence with a doer in it.
The Upanishads, translated by Eknath Easwaran
The Isha Upanishad tells you to enjoy what you do not own
The Isha Upanishad's first two verses deny that anything is yours and in the same breath tell you to enjoy it. They then prescribe a hundred years of work, on the ground that work done this way leaves nothing clinging.
The Katha Upanishad asks the reader to turn the eye back
The Katha Upanishad says the sense organs open outward, so attention goes outward by itself. The one thing the collection asks a reader to do is turn the eye back on itself.
The Katha Upanishad judges a person by what they prefer, not do
The Katha Upanishad says that at every moment two things present themselves: what is good for you and what you are fond of. What tells one person from another is which of the two they prefer, not what they end up doing.
The Katha Upanishad ranks the mind above the senses and their objects
The world you meet is shaped by the equipment you meet it with. The Katha Upanishad puts sense objects above the senses and the mind above both, as a ladder to be climbed.
The Kena Upanishad says what you can worship is not the reality
The Kena Upanishad says that once you can set something up in front of you and worship it, that thing is not the reality being pointed at. It also says no power a faculty uses, such as fire's burning, belongs to the faculty itself.
The Mandukya's fourth is what waking, dream and sleep are made of
The fourth is not another state alongside waking, dreaming and deep sleep. It is what those three are made of, and the text can point at it only by saying what it is not.
The Upanishads offer a procedure to run, not a doctrine to believe
The Upanishads describe a repeatable procedure for turning attention on the mind itself. They offer no way for anyone who has not carried it out to check the result from outside.
Whoever is doing the knowing cannot be found among things known
The one doing the knowing can never be found among the things known. Looking at something only moves it from the unknown pile to the known one, and the knower is in neither pile.
Dṛg‑Dṛśya‑Viveka, Vidyāraṇya or Bhāratī Tīrtha
Anyone who denies the witness is using it to deny it
Not being seen does not mean not being known. The text says the witness is known in every act of knowing, and someone who denies it has to use it in order to deny it.
Anything you can see is not the one seeing
Verse 1 of the Drig-Drishya Viveka says that whatever can be seen is not the seer: the eye sees form, the mind sees the eye, the witness sees the mind, and nothing sees the witness.
Drig-Drishya Viveka's meditations point back to whatever is having the experience
The practice here is not concentrating on an object, and not watching thoughts come and go. It takes an experience and uses it to notice what is having that experience.
Enlightenment does not stop pain, it changes who is watching it
Drig-Drishya Viveka says enlightenment is not a painkiller: the pain goes on exactly as before. What changes is that the person knows themselves as the witness of a body in pain rather than as the body.
Sarvapriyananda treats the witness and the veil as teaching devices
Sarvapriyananda says the whole apparatus, witness, veil and the three selves, is a way of teaching and not the conclusion. Reading it as a list of things that exist is the mistake the text itself warns against.
The Drig-Drishya Viveka says error begins when a difference is forgotten
The Drig-Drishya Viveka says what gets hidden is never the thing itself but a difference: the rope is still seen, only its being a rope is hidden. An appearance on its own does no harm; forgetting the difference turns it into error.
The I makes three identifications and only one is a mistake
The Drig-Drishya Viveka says the I joins itself to three things: to its reflection by nature, to the body by past action, and to the witness by mistake. Only the third is an error, and only an error can be ended by knowing better.
The body seems aware only because awareness is passed down a chain
The Drig-Drishya Viveka says awareness is reflected first in the sense of 'I', which lends it to the mind, the mind to the senses, and the senses to the body. Only the witness actually owns it.
Vedanta says everything has five aspects and only two of them change
Drig-Drishya Viveka holds that anything you experience has five aspects: it exists, it shows itself, it is dear, it has a name and it has a form. Only the name and form change from one thing to the next.
Whatever notices fear is not itself afraid
The Drig-Drishya Viveka says that whatever is aware of a state — fear, doubt, faith — is not itself in that state, and this awareness is already there without looking for it. A witness held in place by effort is not it.
The Alignment Problem, Brian Christian
We lose control to our formal descriptions, not to the machines
Christian argues that the risk is not machines taking over but our formal descriptions of what exists and what we want taking over. Once a system runs on such a description, it reshapes the world to fit it.
The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, Gauḍapāda
Dreamless sleep is not liberation because the world regrows from a seed
In dreamless sleep there is no split between knower and known, which makes it look like liberation. The Karika says it is not: it still holds a seed, and the world grows back from that seed the moment it stirs.
Gaudapada argues that no account of cause and effect holds together
Gaudapada, in the Mandukya Karika, argues that any account of one thing causing another contradicts itself, whichever way you set it up. If that holds, no story of how the world came to be survives examination.
Gaudapada says a thing missing before and after is missing in between
Verse 2.6 of the Mandukya Karika states that whatever is not there at the beginning and not there at the end is not there in the middle either. Shankara applies this to everything we perceive.
Gaudapada treats his own teaching as a ladder to be thrown away
Gaudapada says his own teaching is a device for getting somewhere, not a description of what is there. Even the word non-dual only means something as the opposite of dual, so it goes too.
Not seeing the rope is the whole of the snake mistake
A rope is taken for a snake only because the rope was never properly seen. Nothing extra has been added that must later be removed: when the rope is seen, the snake does not go anywhere, having never been there to go.
Philosophers looking for the self each find what they already believed
The Mandukya Karika says that every school of philosophy, looking for the self, finds its own founding principle — breath, the elements, the void. A man sees whatever view he has been shown.
The Mandukya Karika says nothing is ever born so nobody is freed
The Mandukya Karika holds that nothing is ever born, so there is no one in bondage, no one seeking and no one set free. Being set free would be an event, and an event needs something real to happen to.
The Mandukya Karika says waking is worth no more than dreaming
The Mandukya Karika argues that waking has no better claim to reality than dreaming. The test that real things work fails, because each state cancels the other's currency: a man eats his fill awake and dreams himself starving.
The Mandukya Karika warns a calm session can be a failed one
The Mandukya Karika distinguishes a mind that has come to rest from one that has merely gone dull or to sleep. Some ways meditation fails feel like success, including the pleasure taken in deep absorption.
The Mandukya says awareness is what the three states are made of
The Mandukya says awareness is not a fourth state sitting alongside waking, dreaming and deep sleep. It is what those three are made of, and the text can point to it only by denying everything you could take hold of.
The Ego Tunnel, Thomas Metzinger
A rubber hand can feel like your own within ninety seconds
Metzinger argues that anything taken into the brain's model of itself arrives feeling like yours. The rubber-hand illusion moves that boundary in sixty to ninety seconds.
Feeling that you did something is not proof that you did
The sense that a movement is yours and the sense that you caused it can come apart in either direction. So the feeling of having done something is not evidence that you did it.
Metzinger says a machine matters morally once it has a self-model
Metzinger argues that a system starts to deserve moral consideration at the point where its states are gathered into a model of itself that it cannot see through. Suffering requires that the states be someone's.
Metzinger says a self needs only a body picture mistaken for real
Metzinger argues that being a self takes no action, no sight, no feeling and no thought. All it takes is an inner picture of a body placed in space and time that the system does not recognise as a picture.
Metzinger says an attention-capturing industry takes away part of being a person
Metzinger argues that being able to direct your own attention is one of the deepest parts of being a person. An industry built to capture attention is therefore taking away part of selfhood, not just time.
The brain hides how it builds the self because that is cheaper
Metzinger argues that the brain hides its own model-building from us (transparency) not by mistake but because keeping track of it would cost energy. A system that can imagine many worlds needs one of them flagged as the real one.
The self is a model the brain cannot see as a model
Metzinger says the self is the content of a model the system cannot recognise as a model. That is why it feels like a plain fact about you rather than a picture your brain is making.
Where people feel themselves to be can be moved across a room
Lenggenhager, Metzinger and Blanke filmed a participant's back being stroked and showed it to them a couple of metres ahead. When the stroking was in time and the figure was body-shaped, people reported being in the figure and drifted towards it.
Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, Pali canon, Saṃyutta Nikāya 22.59
The Buddha argues to not-self in steps rather than stating it
In this discourse the Buddha does not simply declare that there is no self. He argues in steps: what changes is impermanent, what is impermanent brings suffering, and what is both is not fit to be taken as mine.
The Buddha calls five things not-self and never says no self exists
In this discourse the Buddha says of five things — body, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness — that each one is not self. He nowhere says that there is no self.
The Buddha says anything you cannot control is not your self
The Buddha argues that a real self would not make you suffer and would obey when told to be a certain way. Body, feeling, perception, will and consciousness do neither, so none of them is the self.
The Buddha says freedom comes from seeing clearly, not from trying hard
In the Anattalakkhana Sutta freedom arrives in four steps that each cause the next: you grow weary of what you took to be yourself, passion fades, you are released, and you know you are released. No effort is asked for anywhere.
The Buddha's eleven categories cover every experience so no self can hide
The Buddha lists eleven categories of experience (past, present and future; inside and outside; coarse and fine; low and high; far and near) so that every kind of experience is checked and nothing is left over in which a self could still be found.
The Buddha's formula names three separate attachments, not one
The formula — this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self — names three separate habits: wanting something is craving, identifying with it is conceit, and taking it to be a self is view.
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, Pali canon, Majjhima Nikāya 10
In this discourse a restless mind is the material not the problem
Desire, ill will, dullness, restlessness and doubt are usually treated as things blocking meditation. In this discourse they are what you observe, which is why the instructions can be given to a beginner at all.
The Buddha says to know a state, not to remove it
Throughout the discourse the instruction is to know how a state comes, how it goes and how it stops returning — never to get rid of it. The removal is what the knowing produces.
The Pali word sati means holding in mind, not bare attention
Sati, the Pali word now translated as mindfulness, means holding something in mind — it is the same word as the Sanskrit for memory. Bare attention is a 1954 gloss by Nyanaponika of one clause of the text's refrain, made to carry the whole.
The Satipatthana Sutta has you watch other people too
In the Satipatthana Sutta the first exercise already asks the practitioner to observe another person's body and mind as well as their own. The practice was never only an inspection of one's own private experience.
The Satipatthana discourse shows its method and never argues for it
The Satipatthana discourse promises a definite result to anyone who practises it for anywhere between seven years and seven days. It sets out the method step by step and never says why watching the body should purify anyone.
The Satipatthana instruction includes putting aside wanting and resisting
The sutta's opening formula tells the practitioner to put aside longing and aversion toward the world as part of the observing itself. This is therefore not an exercise in accepting whatever arises.
The Satipatthana refrain adds five instructions the exercises never give
The refrain repeated after every exercise asks for five things none of the exercises asks for: observe inside, outside and both; observe arising, vanishing and both; hold mindfulness only as far as knowing needs; depend on nothing; cling to nothing.
Why I Am Not a Buddhist, Evan Thompson
Cause and effect alone cannot say which experience belongs to me
Thompson argues that listing what causes what cannot pick out whose experience an experience is: when I say hello, I cause you to hear it and cause myself to hear it. Something must hold a person together, though it need not be a soul.
No brain scan can show enlightenment because the idea decides what counts
Thompson argues that enlightenment only exists under a concept, the way pieces of wood are only chess pieces because people treat them as such. So no brain state is a state of enlightenment by itself; a scan can only show a correlate.
Showing the self is built does not show it is an illusion
Cognitive science shows the self is put together by the brain. Thompson argues that is not the same as showing the self is an illusion, because every illusion is a construction but not every construction is an illusion.
The idea that Buddhism is uniquely scientific was invented in the 1800s
Thompson argues that the belief that Buddhism is uniquely rational and scientific is not an old core recovered. Reformers in the nineteenth century took a colonial argument that possessing science proved Christian superiority, and turned it around.
Thompson says cross-tradition conversation only matters when it unsettles both sides
Thompson argues that a conversation between Buddhism and science is only worth having when it shakes what each side takes for granted. It fails in two ways: decorating science with Eastern metaphor, or using science to validate the tradition.
Thompson says emptiness must apply to science as well
If nothing has a nature independent of concepts, Thompson argues, that must apply to science too. Science would then be judged on whether it works for observers like us, not on whether it matches a mind-independent world.
Thompson says finding mindfulness in a brain region explains nothing
Mindfulness is a way of relating to a situation, not something happening inside the skull. Thompson argues that pointing to the brain region or network where it happens therefore explains nothing about it.
Thompson says meditation alters the mind it is meant to observe
Buddhists claim meditation examines the mind the way a scientist examines nature. Thompson answers that meditation trains and changes the mind while it watches it, so it cannot be the neutral instrument the claim needs.
Thompson says the no-self argument depends on how you define self
Thompson argues the no-self conclusion holds only if a self means a single, separate thing not built from experience. Define it instead as built over time and socially, as James did in 1890 and Mead in 1934, and the same evidence proves far less.
In Over Our Heads, Robert Kegan
Half to two-thirds of adults still take their values from others
Kegan estimates that between half and two-thirds of adults have not fully reached self-authorship (holding a set of values of their own rather than being defined by what the people and groups around them expect).
Kegan says a demand made without support is a punishment
Kegan argues that asking more of people without also giving them the support to meet it is not setting a standard. It is a punishment. People grow where challenge and support arrive together.
Kegan says growth turns what you are into something you can examine
Kegan says people grow by turning what they are fused with into something they can look at. Whatever you are cannot be seen by you; whatever you can hold and examine no longer controls you.
Kegan says students often cannot separate their views from others' expectations
Kegan says a student asked to be self-directing is being asked to make a separation they cannot yet make, between what they think and what the people around them expect. The request feels to them less like an expedition than a mutiny.
Kegan says training cannot give someone a more complex mind
Kegan argues that when a job demands a different kind of mind rather than a missing skill, no amount of training or urging will supply it. Training works on what a mind holds, not on how it is organised.
Nobody in Kegan's studies reached the fifth order of mind
None of the 282 adults in Kegan's studies reached the fifth order of mind. Where a person does move past the fourth order, it never happens before their forties.
Parenting, partnering, work and school all demand the same kind of adult
Kegan argues that parenting, being a partner, work and schooling make one demand in four different vocabularies: each asks for a person who writes their own values rather than one who has taken them from others.
Immunity to Change, Robert Kegan and Lisa Laskow Lahey
Kegan and Lahey say new skills cannot fix a returning habit
Kegan and Lahey say the usual mistake is to meet a problem that needs a change of mind with new skills and information. The test is simple: a behaviour that comes back after honest effort is doing a job for the person.
Kegan and Lahey's tests mark where a big assumption stops holding
In Kegan and Lahey's method the point of testing a long-held assumption is rarely to throw it out. The trouble is that people apply it far beyond where it fits, so the tests mark its proper limits.
People change by running small tests, not by arguing or resolving
Kegan and Lahey argue that people change by running small, safe experiments to find something out. Arguing yourself into a new belief, or resolving to do better, does not produce the change.
People treat their deepest assumptions as plain facts about the world
Kegan and Lahey say a big assumption is not experienced as an assumption. The person holds it as a plain fact about how the world works, and cannot question it while they are looking through it.
People who fail to change are protecting something, not lacking willpower
Kegan and Lahey argue that when you sincerely want to change a behaviour and repeatedly fail, the usual reason is not weak willpower. It is a second, hidden commitment that the failure is serving very effectively.
Picking the right goal decides whether an attempt to change works
In Kegan and Lahey's method everything rests on the goal written in the first column, and it cannot be picked on the spot. Peter's committee chose goals in the room and nothing had changed a year later.
Get Out of Your Mind and Into Your Life, Steven C. Hayes with Spencer Smith
ACT works but its account of why rests on a doubtful questionnaire
The weakest part of acceptance and commitment therapy is its explanation of why it works. The questionnaire used to show that a person's relation to pain is separate from how much pain there is may simply be measuring how bad they feel.
Hayes says a value is a direction you never finish reaching
Hayes argues that a value is a direction you choose, like heading east, and there is no moment of arriving. This is why people can feel depressed after reaching a goal they wanted.
Hayes says the self you describe in words is the dangerous one
Hayes argues that the description a person builds of who they are is the dangerous one, because once you are invested in a label you are also invested in being right about it.
Repeating a word aloud for forty seconds makes you believe it less
Hayes reports that saying a one-word self-description aloud over and over for twenty to forty-five seconds drops how believable it feels in about 95 per cent of people. The meaning does not change; only the hold it has does.
Struggling against pain causes more harm than the pain itself
Hayes argues that what damages a life is not the pain a person feels but the effort spent fighting it off. The damage comes from the struggle, not from the hurt.
The observing self is a viewpoint, not one of your thoughts
In Hayes's therapy the observing self is the place you look from, not another thing you can look at. That is why it can hold your thoughts without being one of them. You find it by noticing who was present at every memory.
Trying not to think of something keeps the thing in mind
Trying not to think of something cannot work, because the instruction — do not think of a yellow Jeep — names the very thing it tells you to avoid, and so keeps it in mind.
Willingness to feel pain predicts functioning better than how much pain
How willing a person is to feel something painful predicts how well they function better than how much of it there is. In chronic pain, measured physical damage barely relates to reported disability; willingness and the ability to act while in pain do.
You can choose when to face a feeling but not how strongly
Hayes argues you can decide when and where you will be open to a painful feeling, but you cannot decide how strong it may get. Being willing only if it does not get too intense is not willingness at all.
Being You, Anil Seth
Making a machine smarter does not bring it closer to feeling
Seth treats consciousness and intelligence as separate dimensions, so making a system more intelligent does not move it any closer to having experiences of its own.
Seth says free will is a skill of keeping options open
Seth argues that free will is a skill — how well you control the options open to you — and not a break in the chain of cause and effect. He counts it as real because brain damage can take it away.
Seth says you see the brain's best guess, not the incoming signals
What you experience is the brain's guess about what caused the signals reaching it, updated when the guess is wrong. You never experience the signals themselves.
The brain signal before a choice may be noise, not a decision
The brain signal that appears before a voluntary movement, called the readiness potential, may not be the brain deciding before you do. Schurger's reading is that ongoing random activity sometimes drifts high enough to cross a threshold, and the movement follows.
The self is five separate parts, each able to break alone
Seth argues the self is not one perceiver but five things built separately: owning a body, having a point of view, willing, holding a life story, and being a social person. Each can fail while the others keep working.
We sense ourselves in order to control ourselves, not to be accurate
Seth argues that we perceive our own bodies in order to regulate them, not in order to know them truly. A model built for control can be wrong about the body and still do its job well.
I Am a Strange Loop, Douglas R. Hofstadter
Gödel showed any system rich enough to describe patterns talks about itself
Gödel showed that a formal system powerful enough to describe any pattern will end up containing statements about itself, even when its designers tried to rule self-reference out.
Hofstadter says a machine with no memory or imagination has no self
Hofstadter argues that a machine that sorts things into categories but has no memory of its own past, no picture of its future and no sense of what might have happened instead has a feedback loop, but not a self.
Hofstadter says having a soul is a matter of degree
Hofstadter says having a soul is a matter of how much, not whether: beings sit at different points on one scale. He accepts what follows — that beings differ in how much consideration they are owed.
Hofstadter says the real cause can be a pattern, not the parts
Hofstadter argues a high-level pattern can be the genuine cause of a low-level physical event. In his chain of dominoes, the true answer to why one domino never falls is that 641 is a prime number, not any account of the dominoes themselves.
Hofstadter says the self is a pattern the brain makes watching itself
Hofstadter argues that what a person calls "I" is a pattern the brain has built by perceiving itself. It is not an object lodged anywhere inside the head.
Hofstadter's self needs symbols about itself and no sight of the machinery
Hofstadter holds that a self requires two things at once: an open-ended set of symbols that can be turned on itself, and no access whatever to the physical machinery doing the thinking.
Aṣṭāvakra Gītā, anonymous, c. 500–800
Ashtavakra says announcing I am brahman proves you are not finished
Ashtavakra 18.16 argues that if you can say “I am brahman”, the work is not done, because the sentence still needs two things: the person saying it and the thing he has seen.
Ashtavakra's free man cannot be told apart from a merely lazy one
The Ashtavakra Gita describes the liberated man so fully that nothing in the description separates him from someone who is simply idle. Both look the same from the outside.
The Ashtavakra Gita defines bondage as the mind wanting or refusing
The Ashtavakra Gita says bondage is simply the mind wanting something or pushing something away, and freedom is the mind doing neither. Neither one is a condition of the world or a rank you reach after years of effort.
The Ashtavakra Gita says effort causes unhappiness and nobody notices
The Ashtavakra Gita says effort is what makes people unhappy, not what cures it, and that nobody notices, because working harder is exactly what people do when they are unhappy.
The Ashtavakra Gita says practice is another chain because you never acted
The Ashtavakra Gita says there is nothing to do, because you never acted in the first place. Trying to meditate your way to freedom is itself one more chain.
The Ashtavakra Gita says the sage still acts but feels no doer
The Ashtavakra Gita says that understanding does not stop a person acting. It removes the sense that someone is doing the acting, so the person watches his own body work as if it belonged to somebody else.
The Ashtavakra Gita says you are not the one who knows
The Ashtavakra Gita says you are not the knower, the first of the three terms knower, known and knowing. You are what all three appear in.
Mindwise, Nicholas Epley
People credit strangers they cannot read with less of a mind
When people cannot read another person's mind, they treat that mind as smaller rather than as unknown. Distant groups are judged less able to feel shame, pride or remorse, so their apologies count for less.
The Media Equation, Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass
People follow social rules with machines without thinking they are people
People apply ordinary social rules, such as politeness and taking sides, to computers and television automatically, on the slightest cue, without believing for a moment that the machine is a person.
Who Sees Human?, Adam Waytz and others
People differ steadily in how much they see minds in objects
Waytz, Cacioppo and Epley found that seeing human minds in objects is a steady trait on which people differ, not something everyone does to the same degree. Hume, who thought it universal, was wrong about it.
Seeing minds in objects and denying minds in people are one scale
Waytz, Cacioppo and Epley argue that seeing a mind in an object and refusing to see one in a person are the same scale read in opposite directions, because resemblance, distance and loneliness each move both ends.
Three things make people treat an object as having a mind
Waytz, Cacioppo and Epley say people treat a thing as having a mind when human ideas are the nearest thing they have for explaining it, when its behaviour needs explaining, and when they want company.
Behave, Robert M. Sapolsky
A meaningless group split makes people favour their own side
Sapolsky reports that Tajfel produced favouritism toward anonymous group-mates using a split as trivial as whether people over- or under-estimated the number of dots in a picture, and that what rises is the opinion of us, not a dislike of them.
An automatic reaction to a face changes with the question asked
Sapolsky reports that the same face photograph sets off a response in the amygdala (a brain alarm area), a bigger one, or none at all, depending on which question the viewer was asked about it thirty seconds earlier. Automatic does not mean unavoidable.
Dopamine signals the gap from what was expected, not the reward itself
Schultz recorded that dopamine neurons fire for the difference between what arrived and what was expected, not for the reward. A steady level of reward therefore stops registering, and the biggest burst moves to the anticipation.
Explaining behaviour from one field alone gets it wrong, not just incomplete
Explaining a behaviour from one discipline alone is not merely incomplete but wrong, because naming one level of cause — a brain region, a hormone, an upbringing, an evolutionary history — has already named every level behind it.
People sort a face by group before they consciously see it
Sapolsky reports that people register which group a face belongs to faster than they consciously see the face. The size of the brain's early alarm response, compared with the later braking response, predicts who shoots an unarmed man in laboratory tests.
Sapolsky says a hormone lowers a threshold instead of adding a behaviour
Sapolsky argues a hormone adds no new behaviour. It lowers the threshold at which a tendency already present gets expressed. That is why testosterone makes a monkey attack only those below it, and also makes people offer more in a fairness game.
The common middle view of free will needs a little person inside
Almost everyone holds that biology accounts for some behaviour while something else stays in charge of the rest. Sapolsky argues that this cannot be stated without a little person inside the head who stands outside the causes.
Determined, Robert M. Sapolsky
People who stop believing in free will do not behave worse
A 2022 meta-analysis of 145 experiments, 95 of them unpublished, found that weakening belief in free will has no consistent effect on ethical behaviour. The priming studies that found cheating had sampled only the people whose belief could be shifted.
Randomness cannot give you free will because random is not free
Sapolsky argues that indeterminacy in physics cannot supply free will. Behaviour that is undetermined is behaviour that is random, and whatever filters that randomness into something sensible has values that came from the seconds and the centuries before.
Sapolsky defines free will so that no evidence could ever support it
Sapolsky requires free will to be a cause with no cause behind it. That definition decides the argument before any evidence arrives, which is why the philosophers he is arguing against were not persuaded.
Sapolsky says Libet leaves free will standing and that settles nothing
Sapolsky grants that Libet's experiments do not disprove free will, and says it does not matter. Forty years of work measured the last few hundred milliseconds before a movement, when the question is where the intention came from.
Sapolsky says chaos makes things unpredictable but leaves nothing free
Sapolsky argues that being unable to predict something is not the same as it being undetermined. In his grid of a hundred thousand boxes, every box was filled in by the rule, and at none of them could anything else have happened.
Sapolsky says learning is a chain of molecular steps, not a decision
Sapolsky argues that we do not change our minds; we are changed. Every step from an unpleasant event to a lasting change in behaviour has a known chemical mechanism, traced in a sea slug and the same in mammals.
Sapolsky says willpower is brain tissue shaped by luck like everything else
Sapolsky argues willpower is not a separate thing you add to what you were handed: it is the prefrontal cortex, the last part of the brain to mature, the most expensive to run, and demonstrably shaped by luck.
Society has twice stopped blaming people without falling apart
The change Sapolsky asks for, removing blame, has already been made twice, and society did not fall apart either time. Neither time was it an argument that did it.
From Bacteria to Bach and Back
A plover adjusts its broken-wing display without knowing why it works
A piping plover luring a predator from its nest watches where it is looking, performs harder when it loses interest, and leaves once it is far enough away — without holding the plan. A behaviour explained without understanding should not be credited with it.
Dennett says competence comes first and understanding is a late product
The design filling the living world is the work of a process that understands nothing, so skill comes before understanding rather than flowing from it. Human comprehension is a late product of that process, not a separate gift.
Introspection gives you a digest built so you could tell others
Looking inward returns an edited summary of the brain's workings, built because organisms had to report their state to each other and not because anyone needed a view of the machinery. Your access to your own mind differs from your reading of someone else's in familiarity, not in kind.
Sweetness is your reaction to sugar read back onto the sugar
There is no sweetness in the structure of glucose, only properties that provoke a response — and the response gets read back into the world as a property of the sugar. When the expectation is met and no error arrives, the brain takes the silence as confirmation.
What the Buddha Taught
Rahula rests the denial of a self on one changed word
Two Dhammapada lines say all conditioned things (samkhara) are impermanent and are dukkha; the third changes the word: no dhamma at all is a self. Since dhamma covers the unconditioned too, no region is left for a self.
Rahula says karma means the act of will and never its result
Karma is defined as volition, the act of will alone, and the word is never used of the result that follows; the system is therefore cause and effect and not moral justice, which would require a judge.
Rahula says nirvana is not an effect of the path
Nirvana is not produced by the path, since anything produced by a cause would be conditioned; one reaches a mountain by a path without the mountain being an effect of the path.
Rahula says the deepest absorptions are conditioned and not the goal
The concentration practice that leads up to the sphere of nothingness and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception is mind-created and conditioned and has nothing to do with the goal; the Buddha learned it from his teachers, was not satisfied, and classed it as a pleasant abiding.
Rahula says there is no thinker standing behind the thought
A being is five aggregates in flux with no unmoving mover behind the movement and no thinker behind the thought; consciousness is one of the five and is named after the condition it arises through, as a fire is named after what it burns.
Rahula traces belief in God and soul to fear and helplessness
The idea of a self has two roots: for self-protection man made God, whom he depends on as a child depends on a parent, and for self-preservation he conceived an immortal soul. A teaching that removes both will be resisted for that reason rather than on the evidence.
The monk Khemaka found no self and still felt I am
Khemaka tells the monks he finds no self in the five aggregates and nothing belonging to one, and is still not free of impurities, because he has the feeling I am without being able to see what it is.
The Society of Mind
Minsky says a mind is made of parts that are not minds
A mind is built from parts that are not themselves minds, and an explanation fails the moment one of its parts turns out to be clever, because the cleverness is then the thing that was supposed to be explained.
Minsky says an inner watcher would need a watcher of its own
Putting a single ruler inside the head explains nothing: give it an inner screen to watch and it needs a self to watch that screen, without end. A thing with no parts supplies no pieces to explain anything with.
Minsky says most of what you see is filled in from expectation
Recognising a scene means fitting a skeleton with blanks to it, and the blanks arrive already filled from past experience, so most of what a person sees was never seen. The alternative to those stereotyped fillings is not better perception but none.
Remembering means switching back on the parts that were active before
A memory is not a stored object but a process. Something attaches itself to whatever was active when a problem was solved, and later switches those same parts back on, putting the mind roughly into the state it was in before.
What reaches awareness is a record of a moment already gone
Being conscious is not knowing what is happening now but using records of what happened a moment ago, and the odd features of awareness follow from the limits on those records rather than from anything mysterious.
Pañcadaśī
A father weeps for a living son on a false report
A father whose son is alive abroad weeps on a liar's word that the boy is dead; a father whose son has really died does not weep, the news not having reached him. The two differ in nothing but what they were told, so the grief is not coming from the world.
Ignorance has two parts and only one of them produces grief
The Pañcadaśī splits ignorance in two: a veiling side, whose one effect is to make a man say the unchanging one does not exist, and a projecting side, which makes him take himself for the doer and the enjoyer. Only the second produces the grief.
Nobody could remember an empty sleep without having been present for it
The Pañcadaśī argues that a man who wakes and says he knew nothing in deep sleep is reporting a memory, and a memory must be of something experienced — so the blank was witnessed, and something was present in a state with no contents.
The grief stops at once and the wound still takes a month
The tenth man, weeping and beating his head, stops weeping the instant he is told. The cut he made takes a month to close, and does not close then. Knowledge cancels the mistake and cancels nothing else.
The man who knows and the man who does not behave alike
Verse 6.267 says that in doing or in leaving undone, in body, senses, mind or intellect, there is not the least difference between the man who does not know and the man who has woken up. The difference is one of conviction only.
The world is not the obstacle and hating it is a mistake
Verse 4.41 says the duality the Lord made does not obstruct, it helps, and it cannot be got rid of — so let it stand, and why should anyone hate it. What a person has to give up is his own second creation, the wanting and the aversion he added.
Three men everyone calls happy share only that they want nothing
Chapter 11 offers three cases everyone grants to be happy — a fed infant on a soft bed, an emperor who has had every pleasure, a learned brahmin who has done what there was to do — and argues that what they share is not what they hold but that nothing is wanted.
Whatever drops out in dream or sleep is not the one reporting
The Pañcadaśī's test is to compare states: whatever is present in one and absent in another is a variable and cannot be what is looking. Run it down the five sheaths and the gross, subtle and causal bodies fall away one at a time.
The Yoga Vāsiṣṭha
A king lived seven years in under an hour of court time
King Lavaṇa shut his eyes in court for less than an hour and came out having lived seven years as an outcaste in the Vindhyas. The chapter tabulates seven such cases: felt duration is generated with the experience and measures nothing outside it.
Demons with no conditioning could not be killed until they said mine
The magician Śambara made three fighters with no previous life and so no conditioning: they did not know victory from defeat, were not afraid of death, and could not be killed. The gods were told to create in them the feelings of I and mine.
Suraghu says the lotus posture gives nothing and daily work prevents nothing
Suraghu's definition of samādhi is that the awakened are in it at all times, including while engaged in the world, and that a man whose mind is not at peace does not get it by sitting in the lotus posture.
Vasistha says conviction makes the action and the action strengthens the conviction
Nothing stores the world between times, since nothing subtler than space could house a seed. What keeps a world standing is repetition: as air passing over flowers takes their scent, the conviction determines the action and the action strengthens the conviction.
Vasistha says the doer, the deed and the seen are all mind
Verse 3.103.18 says that doer, deed and instrument, and the whole spread-out thinkable thing with its seer, seeing and seen, are only mind. The world is not made first and perceived after; the perceiving is the making.
Vasistha says what people call fate is their own past effort
Human effort is of two kinds, past and present, and the past is quickly defeated by the present. What people call fate is only the effort of a previous life arriving as consequence: no one has ever seen a fate.
What Is Intelligence?
A bacterium works out concentration from arrivals instead of reading it off
A chemical concentration is not a fact sitting in the water waiting to be read. It is an average a cell computes over separate arrivals of molecules at its receptors, and the length of the window it averages over is the thing that has to be got right.
Brains grew large in order to model other brains, not the world
Big brains are for keeping track of other big brains. Nicholas Humphrey watched gorillas in the Virunga Mountains in the 1970s and found their lives easy; Robin Dunbar's measurements in the 1990s found cortical volume rising with group size, more steeply in apes than monkeys.
Pain tracks the brain's guess about damage, not the damage itself
A feeling is the body's best inference about its own condition, not a reading taken from it, which is why it can be badly wrong in either direction. A builder needed sedation for a nail that had missed his foot; a worker with a four-inch nail through his palate into his brain reported a mild toothache.
Predicting the next word well requires knowing how the world works
Agüera y Arcas argues that doing next-word prediction properly means solving general intelligence rather than avoiding it. Translate *I dropped the bowling ball on the violin, so I had to get it repaired* into Spanish and the gendered pronoun forces you to know which object broke.
Self-copying programs appeared in a random soup with no selection or mutation
Agüera y Arcas and colleagues filled a soup with 64-byte strings of random values, stuck pairs of them together and ran them, and after millions of interactions the strings began copying themselves. Nothing was selected for, nothing was designed, and the result still appeared with mutation switched off.
The replicators that appeared were built from smaller ones already working
What emerged in the soup was not the smallest thing that could copy itself but an over-engineered one, nested loops filling most of its 64 bytes and running thousands of operations where a couple of hundred would do. It was assembled out of smaller copiers that were already working, rather than reached by small steps from nothing.
The voice in your head is built for your listener
The part of you that narrates and explains is there for other people, not for you, since you already know what you are thinking and they do not. On this account the best liars are the ones who believe themselves.
The Mythos of Model Interpretability, Zachary C. Lipton
Lipton says people pass none of the three transparency tests either
The human decision-maker is the case that literature calls understandable. Nobody can step through their own calculation, say what each part contributed, or guarantee what their learning will produce. People are readable only afterwards, by an account made separately from the decision.
The Consciousness of Self, William James
A Rhode Island preacher lived two months as a shopkeeper named Brown
The Reverend Ansel Bourne drew money in Providence on 17 January 1887 and vanished. On 14 March, a Norristown shopkeeper of six weeks trading as A. J. Brown woke frightened, said his name was Ansel Bourne, and would not believe two months had passed.
A man has one social self for each group whose opinion counts
James says a man has as many social selves as there are people carrying an image of him, and one for every group whose opinion he minds. The youth demure before his parents swaggers like a pirate among his friends.
A past self is yours only where warmth and continuity reach
James says a past self is yours only when it comes back with warmth and resemblance or continuity links it to now. Where they stop, ownership stops: anecdotes of your own infancy raise no blush and no pride, the child as foreign as a stranger's.
James counts a man's clothes and property as parts of his self
James says a man's self is everything he can call his — body, clothes, family, house, reputation, bank account. All of them move him the same way, so losing one is felt as a shrinkage of the person, not a loss of goods.
James drops the Soul because it explains nothing and guarantees nothing
James says positing a soul adds nothing: a brain whose processes produce thoughts in a soul is a more roundabout way of saying that when the brain acts, a thought occurs. He drops the word, having shown only that science has no use for one.
James finds the inner self is movements in the head and throat
James says that when he looks fast enough to catch the feeling of being the one acting, all he finds is bodily: pressure in the eyeballs, a valve in the throat closing at every hesitation, the jaw tightening. The innermost self is these motions.
James makes self-esteem a fraction of success over what you claimed
James says how you feel about yourself is a fraction — what you have done over what you had staked yourself on doing — so giving up a claim raises it as surely as meeting one, and is as much a relief.
The passing thought is the thinker and nothing stands behind it
James says each moment's thought is born knowing the thought before it, finds it warm, takes it as its own, and dies handing the title on. The passing thought is the thinker, and nothing in the facts requires an owner behind the stream.